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"Near, but not too near" is an interesting example of a spatial
decision which is indicative of the nature of a whole range of
problems to which geographers and other spatial analysts have
turned.
My country, maybe, my neighborhood, no way!'
I. INTRODUCTION
In June of 2005, local officials representing the Town of
Brookhaven and Suffolk County on Long Island initiated
"Operation Firestorm," a massive sweep for housing code
violations that led to the eviction of more than 100 men living in
"overcrowded" homes built and zoned for single-family residency.'
All of the evictees were Hispanic immigrants; many worked as
local day laborers, and, it was believed, most were present in this
country, and thus the Town of Brookhaven, illegally.4
Given that "Operation Firestorm" straddles two borders (the
national and the local), two regimes of membership .(national
citizenship and municipal residency), and two legal frameworks
(immigration and local government law), it should come as no
surprise that much of the surrounding controversy centered on
1. PETER GOULD & RODNEY WHITE, MENTAL MAPS 2 (2d ed. 1986).
2. Merlene Davis, Burning Cross Will Accomplish Nothing, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Sept. 26, 2006, at D1 (quoting a message written on a note attached to a burning
cross on the lawn of an immigrant household).
3. See Bruce Lambert, L.I. Is Ordered to Give Notice of House Raids, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2005, at B3 (noting the eviction of dozens of tenants at each residence); see also
Valdez v. Town of Brookhaven, No. 05-CV-4323JSARL, 2005 WL 3454708, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 15, 2005) (describing the issuance of temporary restraining orders to prevent the
return of ousted tenants to their homes).
4. See Valdez, 2005 WL 3454708, at *5 (noting that all evictees were Latino);
Bruce Lambert, On L.I., Raid Stirs Dispute over Influx of Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2005, at 25 (attributing the raid to local concerns about illegal immigrants).
368 [47:2
2010] LOCAL FRAGMENTATION 369
whether to situate the incident in the realm of the national or the
local.' And given the fact that immigration law has been
traditionally understood to be an exclusive national issue-and
thus distinct and separate from the local focus of local
government law-it is not surprising that attempts to reconcile
these two regimes have largely focused on delving further into
this divide. For some, the critical difference is one of legal
jurisdiction and formal power.6 For others, a more meaningful
delineation can be made on the basis of institutional capacity and
bureaucratic expertise.! In almost all cases, however, the focus is
5. On the one hand, many viewed the incident in terms of immigration: a local
proxy battle over national immigration policy, the efficacy of federal enforcement, and the
standing of immigrants who lack the entitlements of citizenship or the protections of legal
status. See Frank Eltman, Long Island Town Is Battlefield in War Against Illegal
Immigration, RECORD (N.J.), Aug. 7, 2005, at A4; Bart Jones, Border Patrol Debate Hits
Home: Neighborhood in Conflict, the View from Farmingville, NEWSDAY, May 16, 2006, at
A25. On the other hand, it was construed by others to be primarily a local dispute: one in
which the issue of immigration was invoked simply to give a new rhetorical fagade to
familiar issues of community self-determination, neighborhood segregation, and the
urban-suburban divide. See, e.g., Valdez, 2005 WL 3454708, at *2 (noting that the
tenants in question were "forced to live in the only place they can afford that is available
to them: non-owner occupied overcrowded rental housing"); Charisse Jones, Crowded
Houses Gaining Attention in Suburbs, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2006, at A5; Sandra Peddie &
Eden Laikin, Crowds of Illegal Homes, NEWSDAY, July 15, 2005, at A2 (citing residents'
concerns regarding changes to the neighborhood).
6. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration
Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 807-26 (2008) (discussing and ultimately dismissing
the idea that the Constitution provides the federal government exclusive power over
admission and removal of noncitizens); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton!
"Illegal" Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal
Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2007) (noting erosion of
Congress's plenary powers over immigration by municipal regulations); Huyen Pham, The
Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of
Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 987-98 (2004)
(stressing the importance of uniform enforcement of immigration laws); Peter J. Spiro,
The States and Immigration in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 121-
23, 174-75 (1994) (advocating application of international norms over constitutional
standards in the treatment of aliens); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry?:
Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 493, 527-52 (2001) (asserting that interpretations of federal exclusivity over
immigration law affect the constitutionality of immigration federalism).
7. See, e.g., Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent
Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 181 (2005)
(asserting successful enforcement of immigration laws depends on assistance from state
and local law enforcement agencies); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to
Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
1373, 1400-01 (2006) (cautioning against abuses of authority by improperly trained local
authorities); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 581 (2008) (designating integration as the state and
local governments' responsibility because it is an immigration-related issue they are well
suited to address); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 67-68 (advocating an increased role for states in immigration
regulation); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L.
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on contrasting the boundary and membership controls at the
national level from those that exist at the local or community
level. But controversies like "Operation Firestorm" do not simply
present close cases for traditional modes of analysis. They also
suggest a more complex view of the relationship between
national and local controls and how they both contribute to our
nation's immigration regime.
To that end, this Article proposes a new approach. Instead of
emphasizing the distinction between immigration and local
government regulations, it argues that boundary and
membership controls at the national and local level are
essentially joined. They are joined not simply because
immigration and local government laws occasionally intersect in
operation or effect, but rather, the connection also lies in the fact
that they can be understood as interdependent counterparts in
the same regulatory scheme. In short, the thesis of this Article is
that the legal structure responsible for the fragmentation of our
lived environment into segregated neighborhoods and
differentiated communities can be understood as a second-order
immigration regulation.' It is a mechanism that allows for finer
regulatory controls than those that can be implemented with the
crude tools of boundary and membership controls at the national
level. It also serves as a means by which, in the absence of a
national consensus, the competing interests surrounding
immigration can still be negotiated and reconciled on the ground.
To appreciate this connection requires us not only to reframe
the national-local divide, but also to expand the scope of our
analysis beyond the sensational but relatively infrequent
instances of direct local involvement in immigration regulation or
enforcement.' Instead, I focus here on what I consider to be a
more pervasive aspect of the immigration-localism relationship:
the degree to which everyday organization of neighborhoods and
communities at the local level supplements immigration laws at
the federal level. To show this, Part II begins by tracing the
doctrinal and historic commonalities that local spatial controls
REV. 1627, 1630-31 (1997) (relating examples where state-level initiatives resulted in
changes in federal regulation of immigration).
8. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration
Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 819 (2007) (defining second-order immigration regulation as
the process of sorting immigration applicants to actively exclude undesirable candidates
and retain desirable candidates).
9. See, e.g., Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C.
L. REv. 1619, 1633-36, 1642-44, 1658-60 (2008) (observing how local enforcement officers
exploit federal immigration laws without impeding federal enforcement efforts); see also
infra notes 183-87 and accompanying text (noting the use of local regulations, such as
housing codes, to discourage immigrant presence).
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like zoning, and local membership controls like residency, have
with their national counterparts' regulation of immigration and
citizenship.
Building upon this, Part III posits a complex
interdependence between national and local by rejecting the
common view that the use of local regulatory controls of space
and community is a result of limitations or failures in federal
regulations, or that local regulatory controls are simply imperfect
substitutes for more extensive or effective federal restrictions.
Rather, I argue that in a system plagued by ambivalence-in
which few can agree on the purpose of immigration or the role of
immigrants in our economic or democratic order-the finer
distinctions that local divisions make possible play a unique role
that cannot be filled otherwise. In other words, the subtle
interplay between the local and the national with regard to
immigration should be seen less as a struggle over jurisdiction
and power and more as a careful negotiation of which site is the
most appropriate point of openness and closure.
Part IV then explores some of the intriguing possibilities and
difficult questions that this reorientation raises. Intriguing
because understanding the national and the local as an
integrated and complementary system suggests that direct
engagement with local mechanisms of spatial and community
control may offer another means by which policy objectives or
concrete federal reforms can be effectuated. Yet difficult because
it suggests that, rather than simply another regulatory tool in
the toolbox, local controls are not as straightforward as many
now believe, and untangling their relationship with immigration
prompts us to question our own complex relationship with the
issue of immigration as well. And as this Article demonstrates,
these questions are all the more important because there is no
neutral baseline upon which we can rely; regardless of how we
feel about the promise or dangers of employing internal
fragmentation as a part of our immigration regime, it is already a
significant part. In other words, it is too late to simply deny or
ignore this aspect of our legal response to immigration.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Describing our immigration regime exclusively from a
national perspective is too limited a scope to describe how we
select immigrants and incorporate them into the American
mainstream. Rather, as this Part argues, we must conceive of our
immigration regime as one both developed and operated in the
2010] 371
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shadow of an extensive and pervasive structure of internal
regulations of space and community, which fragments the social,
political, and economic space of American society along an
intricate system of internal boundaries and jurisdictions. In this
light, the formal rules that govern who is permitted to enter our
country or naturalize as citizens are but one component of this
nation's broader immigration policy. Our continuing history of
regional fragmentation and the local government policies that
have been developed to make that possible constitute an often
hidden, but equally important, secondary component in the
nation's attempt to balance the competing aims of our
immigration regime.
Here, I draw upon the work of local government scholars who
argue that the organization of our local communities, and the
consequences of this structure, cannot be wholly explained as a
product of individual preference or market dynamics." Like the
immigration regime, subnational boundaries are also the product of
legal frameworks that empower communities to organize
themselves in particular ways and to skew market incentives in
favor of the building of walls, both figurative and literal." Indeed, as
many urban scholars have long recognized, municipal boundaries
can sometimes be just as difficult to penetrate as national borders. 2
Similarly, whether one has residence on one side or the other can
have profound effects on the availability of valuable social and
economic resources, not to mention a basic sense of safety and
stability." Seen in this manner, the immigration regime is neither
an exceptional nor singular regime of regulatory control. Rather, it
is better understood as one point along an expansive spectrum of
10. See, e.g., GERALD E. FRUG, CITY MAKING 3 (1999) (stating that urban landscapes
are shaped by both individual choices and government policies); CONSTANCE PERIN,
EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE 174 (1977) (noting the contribution of cultural preferences and
social rules to population distributions).
11. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION 122-23 (2004)
(describing the rise of gated communities, especially in states experiencing
unprecedented growth of immigrant residents); MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 246
(Vintage Books 1992) (1990) (describing local efforts to restrict and fence neighborhoods
and public space). See generally EDWARD J. BLAKELY & MARY GAIL SNYDER, FORTRESS
AMERICA (1999).
12. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371,
416-20 (2001) (positing that controls used to maintain the character of a community
impede the entrance of new residents who do not fit that community).
13. The "political geography" of local communities-in short, "the position and
function of jurisdictional and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries"-creates much of the
"separate and unequal distribution of political influence and economic resources" that
characterizes our society. Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political
Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844 (1994); see also DOUGLAS S.
MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID 149 (1993) ("Where one lives-
especially, where one grows up--exerts a profound effect on one's life chances.").
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legal techniques by which we demarcate, define, and enforce the
role of space and community in American society.
A. Space, Immigration, and the Internalization of Boundary
Controls
One way of reexamining the federal-local relationship is to
approach it along the axis of space. This approach offers certain
advantages. Space provides a natural continuum upon which the
recursive boundaries and overlapping jurisdiction of immigration
and local government law can be mapped. It also highlights the
common ground upon which these two regimes of territorial
control interrelate.
Here, I set out this spatial continuum by comparing the
regulatory regimes that influence the admission of immigrants
into certain neighborhoods with those that determine their initial
entry into this country. Namely, I focus on two particular aspects
of this relationship: the legal and historic ties between local land
use regulations and federal immigration laws. Before turning to
this, however, we begin by considering how spatial issues are
commonly understood in the immigration context by examining
the contested role of the immigrant enclave.
1. The Multiple Significance of Spatial Fragmentation. As
geographers Mark Ellis and Richard Wright explained: "Where
immigrants live matters."" Of course, acknowledging this is only
the beginning of the inquiry; how and why it matters depends a
lot on how we define the role and meaning of space in American
society. Indeed, the geography of immigrant settlement can tell
us not only about its residents or their life chances, but also
about the different identities that get attached to physical spaces.
This is one reason for the persistent controversy surrounding
immigrant enclaves, a space often described as being
simultaneously foreign and domestic.
The duality of the immigrant enclave is, in large part,
intentional. From the perspective of immigrant residents, the
enclave is an important form of spatial negotiation that allows
them to mitigate the transformative and disorienting
consequences of crossing one boundary through the creation of
another. The cultural, social, and economic niches that enclaves
provide serve as a crucial bridge between the old country and the
new, and in so doing offer a measure of negotiating power to
14. Richard Wright & Mark Ellis, Race, Region and the Territorial Politics of
Immigration in the US, 6 INTL J. POPULATION GEOGRAPHY 197, 197 (2000).
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immigrants trying to grapple with the positive and negative
aspects of immigration." Of course, enclaves carry the potential
for exploitation as well as protection.16 But for many recent
arrivals, they are unique in being able to offer access to the
benefits of immigration without the need to endure all of its
tremendous costs. In this respect, immigrant settlement is
inextricably connected to the process of immigration itself; like
the push factors that compel immigrants to leave and the pull
factors that guide their resettlement, local spatial negotiations
through enclaves are also a crucial factor that determines the
direction and rate of immigration flows.
At the same time, it is precisely because of this duality that
enclaves often cause alarm among receiving nations. Much of this
is because immigrant concentration traditionally underlies some
of the most intense fears associated with immigration: territorial
separatism and demographic balkanization. This fear is not
new." Nor is it outdated, as the contemporary warnings of
Patrick Buchanan and Samuel Huntington suggest.'" To be sure,
cultural and ethnic differences presented by immigrant (and
other minority) groups have long been considered to be potential
sources of discomfort. Nevertheless, it is often when these
differences are grafted upon demarcated spaces that fears about
national disintegration begin to form."
15. See, e.g., ROGER WALDINGER, STILL THE PROMISED CITY? 23-26 (1996)
(observing that these enclaves provide privileged access to jobs and other commercial
opportunities); Alejandro Portes & Robert D. Manning, The Immigrant Enclave: Theory
and Empirical Examples, in COMPETITIVE ETHNIC RELATIONS 47, 61-65 (Susan Olzak &
Joane Nagel eds., 1986) (contending the physical concentration of enclaves can meet all of
newcomers' physical needs).
16. Peter Kwong, Manufacturing Ethnicity, 17 CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY 365,
366 (1997) (observing that the ethnic solidarity in New York's Chinese community "has
increasingly been manufactured by the economic elite," most of whom do not live in the
community itself, "to gain better control over their co-ethnic employees"); Jimy M.
Sanders & Victor Nee, Limits of Ethnic Solidarity in the Enclave Economy, 52 AM. SOC.
REV. 745, 763 (1987) ("Employers typically draw on ethnic solidarity to enforce and
maintain sweatshop conditions. . . .").
17. See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind,
Peopling of Countries, Etc., in 3 THE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 63, 72-73 (Albert
Henry Smith ed., 1905) (expressing fears that Anglo-American cultures would be
displaced by those of other races, such as Germans or Africans).
18. See PATRICK J. BUCHANAN, THE DEATH OF THE WEST 3 (2002) (expressing
concerns that uncontrolled immigration would erode the American identity into disparate
groups); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S
NATIONAL IDENTITY 221-56 (2004) (describing threats of balkanization arising from
twentieth-century phenomena); see also William H. Frey, Immigration and Internal
Migration "Flight" from US Metropolitan Areas: Toward a New Demographic
Balkanisation, 32 URB. STUD. 733, 733-34 (1995) (attributing contemporary occurrences
of balkanization to uneven dispersal of immigrants throughout the United States).
19. See JEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP 28-29 (1994) (discussing
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For these two reasons, residential mobility takes on a unique
significance with regard to immigrant residents. Indeed, this
mobility can often be seen as an extension of the original act of
immigration. This is particularly evident in what is now
commonly known as the spatial assimilation model of immigrant
incorporation.2 0 Because local territorial space provides the
framework upon which fears of separatism are based, the ability
to transcend neighborhood and municipal boundaries serves as a
measure of an immigrant group's assimilation into mainstream
American society. And since Ernest Burgess linked cultural and
social assimilation to the ubiquitous metropolitan form by
describing an immigrant journey as beginning in the inner-city
ghettos and ending when they reach the outer zones, 21 residential
mobility (and, more often than not, residential mobility into
white Anglo suburbs) has served as a significant measure of
*22immigrant assimilation.
The development of our formal immigration laws has not
been blind to the nuances behind this geography. Indeed, some of
the earliest instances of federal involvement in immigration were
due precisely to these concerns. In his speech before Congress in
1903, President Roosevelt warned that whether immigration was
of the "right" or "wrong" kind depended not just on the
characteristics of the potential immigrants, but also the
geography of their residency once they arrived.23 This view,
the tendency of land claims to fuel violent nationalist conflicts between competing
groups). It is therefore no surprise that in the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court
upheld state restrictions against immigrant ownership of real property by repeatedly
linking the issue directly to the security and existence of the state. See Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 221 (1923) ("The quality and allegiance of those who own,
occupy and use the farm lands within [state] borders are matters of highest importance
and affect the safety and power of the State itself."); cf HUNTINGTON, supra note 18, at
221 (labeling the recent wave of Mexican immigration to the Southwest as a "reconquista"
of territories that were either annexed or lost to America during the mid-nineteenth
century).
20. See RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM 29
(2003) (reasoning that successful acculturation of ethnic families enables residential
mobility and structural assimilation).
21. Ernest W. Burgess, The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research
Project, in THE CITY 47, 56-62 (Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess & Robert D. McKenzie
eds., 4th impression 1967). Some have characterized this assimilation not simply as a
process of becoming American, but as a process by which European immigrants, who were
initially construed as racially distinct, were recruited and assimilated into "whiteness" in
part to protect neighborhoods from other racial minorities, especially blacks. DAVID R.
ROEDIGER, WORKING TOwARD WHITENESS 176 (2005).
22. See Wright & Ellis, supra note 14, at 200 (noting that the vast majority of the
assimilation "research still assumes that access to white suburbs is central to minority
group assimilation").
23. 38 CONG. REC. 2-3 (1904). In his address before the Fifty-ninth Congress,
Roosevelt's concern about the distribution of immigrants was even more explicit. He
2010]1 375
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however, was hardly new; congressional and executive responses
to immigration had long reflected these concerns. The
nineteenth-century Homestead Act2 4 and the federal effort to
promote noncitizen voting in frontier states were not only
attempts to encourage immigration, but also to direct these flows
to rural destinations and away from the urbanizing eastern
seaboard.25 Similarly, the literacy requirement that dominated
the immigration debates in the following decades reflected not
just a general and growing aversion to immigration, but also the
belief that "the immigrants who would be excluded by the
illiteracy test" were the ones who "do not go out into the Western
and Southern States, where immigration is needed, and become
an agricultural population, but remain almost entirely in the
Atlantic States, and in the great centers of population where the
labor market is already overcrowded." 26 Proactive efforts were
initially taken at the administrative level to channel immigration
flows and influence their initial settlement." Eventually, however,
fueled by the perception that the immigrants arriving at the turn
of the century were unlike the "old" immigrants of earlier
decades whose assimilation was thought to have been "facilitated
by their widespread distribution and by their settlement on the
land as well as in the cities,"" comprehensive immigration
legislation was passed that severely curtailed all immigration in
accordance to specific quotas based on national origin.2 9
suggested that besides limitation on immigration into the United States as a whole,
regional limitations should be imposed as well, such as those with respect to immigration
to New York in favor of the South or immigration inland as opposed to the cities. 40
CONG. REC. 101 (1906).
24. See Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976) (providing
opportunities to claim land in unsettled areas); DANIEL J. TICHENOR, DIVIDING LINES 66
(2002) (citing the Homestead Act as a federal effort to encourage immigration in the
West).
25. See HIROSIil MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING 116-17 (2006); Jamin B.
Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1395, 1407 (1993) (noting states'
efforts to attract immigrant settlers through enfranchisement).
26. S. REP. No. 290, at 23 (1896), quoted in U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM'N,
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION, S. DOC. No. 61-758, at 47 (3d Sess. 1911); see also Form New
Bureau to Handle Aliens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1920, at 27 (quoting Immigration
Commissioner Frederick A. Wallis's complaint about the "evils" associated with the
"congestion of immigrants in the cities").
27. See, e.g., Immigrants to Have Chance to Own Land, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1921,
at 14 (detailing coordination of several federal agencies "to divert immigrants from the
cities [and] to place the newcomers on small farms"); Sorting Out the Americans of the
Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1907, § 5 (Magazine), at 7 (describing the problem of
concentration and detailing some administrative initiatives to disperse the immigrant
population).
28. DAVID WARD, CITIES AND IMMIGRANTS 55 (6th prtg. 1977).
29. Emergency Quota Act, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
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Yet if the quota legislation of the 1920s was based in part on
the residential patterns of immigrants already present, that it
took this draconian form was also the result of early doubts about
the federal government's ability to address the residential
patterns of immigrants in a more direct and deliberate fashion.
Indeed, the very grounds upon which the federal government's
expansive power over immigration was justified also served to
limit the manner and purpose to which its regulations can be
applied. For example, in Gegiow v. Uhl, a unanimous Supreme
Court held that the likelihood of becoming a public charge in a
particular city, on account of the labor conditions of that city,
could not be used as a basis for excluding the entry of an
immigrant altogether.o Focusing on the statutory authorization
in question, the Court concluded that federal authorities are
limited to "exclu[sions] on the ground of permanent personal
objections accompanying [the arriving immigrants and]
irrespective of local conditions."" The Court's statutory
interpretation, however, was also interwoven with reservations
about the federal government regulating in this manner at all.
Not only did the Court refer to the federal immigration officials'
assertion that local labor conditions can be used to exclude
immigrants by referring to it as "an amazing claim of power," but
more importantly, it opined that "as officers of the General
Government, they would seem to be more concerned with [the
nation as a whole] than with the conditions of any particular city
or State.""
The details surrounding the peculiar relationship between
federal power and immigrant geography has evolved since then,
but many aspects of this delicate balance remain the same. The
federal immigration debate is as concerned as ever about the
local spatial residency of immigrants. At the same time, most
direct federal attempts to regulate or even influence the
geography of immigrant settlement have faded from view. The
only area where the federal government attempts to exert any
appreciable influence is with respect to the initial settlement of
overseas refugees, a decision made with the counsel of religious
and other charitable organizations." Moreover, since Uhl, courts
have routinely interpreted federal silence with respect to the
30. Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1915).
31. Id. at 10.
32. Id.
33. See DAvID A. MARTIN, THE UNITED STATES REFUGEE ADMISSIONS PROGRAM 128
(2004). Interestingly, the familiar concerns about dispersal are still present. See
Jacqueline Desbarats, Indochinese Resettlement in the United States, 75 ANNALS ASS'N
AM. GEOGRAPHERS 522, 526 (1985).
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relevance of local conditions to suggest that free domestic
mobility is an explicit federal privilege guaranteed by
admission. Thus, to the extent that residential patterns of
immigrants are still a concern, it appears to be one that may be
taken into consideration when formulating admission and
removal criteria, but not one that is tinkered with directly.
2. The Joint Construction of Spatial Fragmentation.
Although federal immigration laws have largely abandoned any
sustained or substantial effort to regulate the spatial dimensions
of immigrant residency, it does not necessarily follow that our
nation's immigration regime, broadly understood, leaves this
area unregulated. Nor is it necessarily the case that, just because
space is used by immigrants to negotiate the effects of
immigration, enclaves are entirely the product of individual
choice or exist solely to serve immigrant interests. Residential
geography is also controlled in large part by a different set of
background legal rules," and considering how effectively
geography is used by immigrants to balance the various trade-
offs of immigration, it is not surprising to see local spatial
controls as an aspect of how we negotiate the competing concerns
of our immigration regime.
To be sure, entrance controls at the local level do differ in
significant ways from federal immigration regulations. One is
usually not required to petition for authorization to enter or live
in a particular community," nor do localities ordinarily possess
the power to forcefully remove unwanted visitors or residents.
From this perspective, it is not difficult to see why immigration
scholars often contrast the ostensible "indifference" of local space
with the heavily regulated borders that demarcate nation-states.
34. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 (1915) (stating that immigrant entry
into the United States confers the privilege of entry and residence in any state).
35. Of Robert E. Park, Immigrant Heritages, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 492, 494-96 (1921) ("One reason immigrants live in a
colony is that they cannot get out.. .. [The immigrant] lives in a colony of his own
people because, under ordinary circumstances, that is the only place he can live at all."); see
also David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, The Census as a Call to Action, 29 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1387, 1390 (2002) (observing that immigrant preferences are confined to the type of
communities that the existing local government structure encourages and permits).
36. See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITs 26 (1981).
37. But see Jennifer Wolch, From Global to Local: The Rise of Homelessness in Los
Angeles During the 1980s, in THE CITY: LOs ANGELES AND URBAN THEORY AT THE END OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 421 (Allen J. Scott & Edward W. Soja eds., 1998) (describing
how cities in the 1980s sometimes dealt with the problem of homeless residents by
transporting them to another city).
38. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 37 (1983) (describing nineteenth-
century political economists' belief that "[i]nternational society .. . should take shape as a
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Upon closer inspection, however, it is not clear that the
distinction is all that stark. The fact is, movement across our
metropolitan regions, especially movement associated with local
residency, is far from frictionless. Scholars have carefully
documented the obstacles to regional mobility and how they
fracture our lived environment into distinct spatial districts. For
most of us, however, personal experience and everyday
observations are more than sufficient to make that fact seem
painfully clear. It is not simply that our metropolitan regions are
"divided into districts that are so different from each other they
seem to be different worlds,"" but also that we often know too
well where we do and do not belong, and where we can and cannot
live. And despite a number of social and legal reforms, evidence
shows that segregation, especially involving race, ethnicity, or
class, remains a staunch feature of American society.4 o Thus, even
if in most instances no fence delineates the boundaries that
separate our local communities," it is clear that a host of
pressures effectuate a similar fragmentation on the ground.
The causes for this are many, and it is not my intention here
to discount the various social,4 2 structural,4 3 and technological"
explanations. For the purposes of our comparison, however, it is
important to recognize that legal regulations also play a role.
Legal restrictions offer both the mechanisms and incentives for
particular forms of spatial organization." Moreover, they impart
and help harden the meaning and identity that is often
world of neighborhoods, with individuals moving freely about, seeking private
advancement"); Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 229, 245-46 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
39. Gerald E. Frug, The Geography of Community, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1996).
40. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID
(1993); SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA (James H. Carr & Nandinee K
Kutty eds., 2008).
41. But see GARY J. MILLER, CITIES BY CONTRACT 87-91 (1981) (describing the
incorporation of the City of Rolling Hills coterminous with the gated community (and the
Community Association) of Rolling Hills).
42. See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 54-55
(1994) (discussing the role of racial and ethnic prejudice); TOM MARTINSON, AMERICAN
DREAMSCAPE 54-55 (2000) (discussing the value of personal space); MASSEY & DENTON,
supra note 40, at 109-10; JON C. TEAFORD, CITY AND SUBURB 10 (1979) ("Thle] political
process of fragmentation into segregated units thus reflected the cultural and economic
fissures in the nation.').
43. See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 40, at 96-100 (examining systematic
steering by realtors).
44. See PETER HALL, CITIES OF TOMORROW 304-05 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining the
development of automobiles and roads as a catalyst for municipal fragmentation); SAM
BASS WARNER, JR., THE URBAN WILDERNESS 118-20 (1972).
45. See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER 191-230 (1985) (describing the
effects of federal housing policy, FHA redlining, and public housing programs).
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associated with space in American society.46 And of all the
relevant legal mechanisms, few have attracted as much
attention as local land use controls, especially the practice of
zoning.
Part of the reason for the interest in zoning is the pervasive
effect that many commentators attribute to its continued and
widespread use. Working through technical restrictions like
setback and frontage requirements, its influence on regional
organization is often indirect. But the consequences are extensive
and enduring." By imposing zoning restrictions that prohibit
apartments or other multi-family development, or requirements
that impose minimum lot sizes or square footage, communities
have used carefully crafted zoning policies to drive up housing
costs and limit housing selection, with the added consequence of
pricing out low- and sometimes moderate-income residents."
Moreover, the now-common practice of zoning in such a way so as
to foreclose all viable development on vacant land, and only
rezoning to make land available after a particular developer has
presented concrete plans for approval, gives communities even
finer control than zoning provides for directly.4 9 In addition,
housing codes that limit the number or type of individuals
permitted to share a given residence, or how existing structures
can be used, further ensure that these spatial controls are
insulated from creative living arrangements or changing use."
Like the physical characteristics that they target, zoning
regulations are often justified with respect to physical effects like
noise, traffic congestion, or aesthetic "fit.""1 Nevertheless, the fact
that many of these effects are also associated with "the wrong
46. See Ford, supra note 13, at 1856-57 (noting that space "grounds both
governmental and associational entities").
47. See Dowell Myers, Demographic Futures as a Guide to Planning: California's
Latinos and the Compact City, 67 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N 383, 393 (2001) (warning that
the "housing construction of today will have a very long legacy").
48. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF ExcLUSION 74-76 (1976)
("Whether formal or informal, suburban controls on residential development contribute to
the rising cost of housing, and consequently reduce housing opportunities.").
49. See Snyder v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d 65, 72-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991) (describing the original intent of zoning undeveloped land as a "wait and see"
approach, placing the burden of zoning on the landowner rather than the government).
50. See Planning & Zoning Comm'n v. Synanon Found., Inc., 216 A.2d 442, 443-44
(Conn. 1966) (questioning the application of the term "family" used in the zoning
ordinance); City of Brookings v. Winker, 554 N.W.2d 827, 831 (S.D. 1996) (noting that the
imposition of an ordinance allowing persons related by blood or law to live together but
not allowing unrelated persons to live together was irrational for the purpose of
controlling population density).
51. See DANIELSON, supra note 48, at 50-51 (explaining that the specific aim of
zoning is to protect public health and safety).
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kind of people" is often intentional.52 In the words of one
commentator, it is no mere coincidence that seemingly benign
requirements such as those mandating that "single-family homes
should prevail over two-family homes or apartments, or that one-
acre lots [are] to be required instead of quarter-acre lots" would
have "powerful social repercussions in a society of mixed
population and markedly unequal distribution of family income.
To be sure, the widespread legitimacy of zoning that is now
taken for granted was not always so clear." However, in the
decades that followed the Supreme Court's embrace of
comprehensive zoning in the landmark case of Village of Euclid
v. Ambler Realty Co.," legal support for zoning continued to
strengthen, especially as its use became more prominent. As a
result, when the second wave of zoning challenges reached the
Court in the mid-1970s on the basis of the Court's new equal
protection jurisprudence, the underpinnings of Euclid continued
to hold. Finding no constitutional infirmity with a local housing
ordinance that banned households with more than two unrelated
individuals in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, the Court
remarked on zoning's importance in creating "zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people."" Similarly,
although the Court acknowledged in Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp." that a nearly-white"
Chicago suburb's denial of a zoning variance for multi-family
construction would likely have racially disparate impact, and
recognized that community concerns about racial integration
played a role, the Court pointed confidently to the Village of
Arlington Heights' longstanding and "undeniabl[e] commit[ment]
to single-family homes as its dominant residential land use" in
support of its finding that no racially discriminatory intent could
be discerned." Indeed, through these and other decisions, the
Court appeared committed to maintaining lines of division even
while (or precisely because) others were being dismantled. Thus,
it wasn't surprising that the unprecedented desegregation effort
undertaken by courts following Brown v. Board of Education6 0
52. FRUG, supra note 10, at 144.
53. WARNER, supra note 44, at 32.
54. See, e.g., id. at 35-37.
55. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
56. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
57. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
58. Of its 64,000 residents, only 27 were black. Id. at 255.
59. Id. at 269.
60. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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was functionally abandoned after Milliken v. Bradley, in which
the Supreme Court insulated urban-suburban segregation from
federal judicial scrutiny in large part out of deference to
municipal boundaries and local control.6 1
Described in this manner, it is not difficult to see how local
spatial controls like zoning parallel our national immigration
regime. Both rely on geographic jurisdictions and physical
boundaries, and both act as organizational tools that create and
maintain social and physical geography. To be sure, as the
description above makes clear, the manner in which local spatial
controls operate is limited; they act mainly with regard to certain
kinds of movement (those associated with residency) and against
certain types of individuals (primarily on the basis of class,
though in ways that are inextricably intertwined with race and
ethnicity62 ). But despite the multitude of accounts about the
hardening of our national borders, it is important to note that,
under even our most restrictive immigration regimes, they too
operated in much the same way. While strict prohibitions limit
the transnational movement of some, broad concessions are
provided to accommodate the mobility of others.63 Moreover, the
individuals who tend to be restricted at our national borders also
tend to be ones most likely to face barriers and obstacles at the
local and neighborhood level. In this respect, the two systems
complement and map onto one another.
Nor are the similarities between immigration and local land
use controls limited to their like effects. Notwithstanding the
radically different legal standing of localities and the nation,
deference to their respective borders have imbued both with
analogous political identities and legal constructions.
Commenting on the extent to which localities "act in their own
self-interest, cooperate with others on their own terms, and cause
harm to those who disagree with them," Jerry Frug emphasized
the link between the legal construction of the locality with that of
the individual and the nation by referring to all three as
"centered subjects."' And the manner in which the courts have
61. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-82 (1977); see also Ford, supra note
13, at 1875-76 (contending the Milliken Court "may have allowed the historical
segregation to become entrenched" by severely restricting the scope of the remedy).
62. See generally William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH.
L. REv. 1, 1-3 (1999) (describing the "historical knot of race and class").
63. See, e.g., AIHWA ONo, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP 6 (1999) (arguing that certain
classes of individuals in today's globalizing economy are able to, with the encouragement
of states, travel freely between nation-states and shift fluidly from one social-political
context to another).
64. Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253,254--55,258 (1993).
382 [ 47:2
LOCAL FRAGMENTATION
treated extraterritorial effects at the national and local level
bears these accounts out. Thus, just as the prospect of indefinite
detention famously faced in Shaughnessy v. Mezei was
understood by the Court in the immigration context not as a
deprivation of liberty but as a regrettable yet unintended side-
effect of the nation's sovereign right to exclude,65 the isolation
created by racial segregation, concentrated poverty, and their
attendant effects are all too often construed in the local
government context as an unfortunate yet inadvertent
consequence of local legal autonomy and the sanctity of
municipal boundaries.66 Similarly, to the extent that cases like
Landon v. Plasencia suggest that the breadth of the immigration
power can be seen as a consequence of the limited standing of
immigrants outside the nation to challenge denials of
admission," cases like Warth v. Seldin show that in spite of
common bonds of state and national citizenship, the standing of
those outside a given locality to challenge land use regulations
with similar exclusionary effects are often construed as lacking
in the same way."
3. The Shared History of Spatial Fragmentation. That
immigration and zoning regulations would share such striking
similarities in doctrines and effect is no mere coincidence. Aside
from the doctrinal connections, the two also share deep historical
roots. Indeed, it can be argued that immigration and local spatial
controls were envisioned as counterparts of a broader regulatory
regime from the very start. To see this, we must turn to the
65. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1953). For a more contemporary
reincarnation of Mezei, see Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2009),
vacated per curiam, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010).
66. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 451-53 (1990) (explaining that local autonomy can act as an obstacle
to reduce inequality).
67. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32-34 (1982); see also Adam B. Cox,
Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 373, 375-76 (2004)
(explaining that aliens lack standing because they are in some sense "strangers to the
Constitution" and "any injuries immigration law inflicts upon [them] are not legally
cognizable").
68. Rejecting a challenge led primarily by poor minority residents of Rochester and
their "representatives" against the exclusionary zoning policies of the nearly all-white
suburb of Penfield, the Warth Court emphasized their tangential relationship to their
neighboring community by noting that none had "interest in any Penfield property; none
is himself subject to the [zoning] ordinance's strictures; and none has ever been denied a
variance or permit by respondent officials." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1975).
The catch-22 is palpable: "if they could afford to become residents of Penfield, they would
have standing to sue but no grievance; conversely, because they could not afford to
become residents of Penfield-the gravamen of their complaint-they did not have
standing to sue." Schragger, supra note 12, at 419.
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circumstances surrounding the rise of comprehensive
immigration and zoning regulations during first decades of the
twentieth century.
As Constance Perin observed, "The social movements
favoring zoning and immigration restriction each culminated in
legislation in the 1920s. Zoning was being promulgated by social
reformers and real estate interests during the same years that
the country was for the first time debating its policy of open
immigration."69 This near-simultaneous emergence makes sense
when one considers the timeline of preceding events: not only did
the decades leading up to this period mark one of the most
significant and contentious influx of immigrants in American
history, but it was also a time when the social and spatial
geography of the United States was undergoing fundamental
transformations ranging from the settlement of the western
frontier to the rapid urbanization taking place in "whirlpool
cities" scattered across the Northeast and the Midwest.o
That the issue of immigration would be so closely tied to
both the settlement of the western frontier and the urbanization
of America was, of course, due in no small part to the fact that
immigrant presence and labor played a major, if not decisive, role
in both. Nevertheless, this close link also meant that
immigration became inseparable from a host of spatial issues
associated with these events. The presence of immigrants in the
country's newly settled territories along the western frontier
challenged the comforting assurances of manifest destiny with
difficult questions about national identity and collective
territorial ownership." At the same time, the foreign stock whose
increasingly urban presence dominated nearly all the country's
fast-growing cities gave rise to serious doubts about America's
democratic foundations,72 especially as it was becoming
increasingly clear that "the twentieth century city [would] be
decisive of national destiny."" Thus, amidst increasing demands
69. PERIN, supra note 10, at 194.
70. See ROBERT FISHMAN, BOURGEOIS UTOPIAS 10-15 (1987). See generally ARTHUR
MEIER SCHLESINGER, THE RISE OF THE CITY 1878-1898 (1933).
71. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 70, at 29 (describing the conflicted perception of
the West as at once the most foreign and most distinctly "American" part of America).
72. See DELOS F. WILCOX, THE AMERICAN CITY 5-6 (1904) (analogizing America to a
club whose new members lack knowledge of its original purpose). Indeed, this doubt was
echoed a lot earlier. E.g., ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 399-401
(Phillips Bradley ed., Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 2001) (1835) (citing rapid
population growth and the influx of immigrants in western states as a threat to American
democracy).
73. JOSIAH STRONG, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CITY 32 (Arno Press 1970) (1898);
accord WILCOX, supra note 72, at 22 ("The city problem is a national problem, and there is
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for social control and market stability, the free-for-all of the
frontier states and the old "private" city were giving way to an
era of municipal planning, institutional reform, and an
"ecological" outlook on urban development." And where land use
controls alone could not be used to guarantee such stability,
mobile residents and the developers who catered to them quickly
turned to the periphery, where spatial distance could be exploited
to produce a similar effect through isolation."
Indeed, because of the strong link between immigration and
what many perceived to be the problems associated with western
settlement and urbanization, the battles over the organization of
local spaces were, for many people, inseparable from concerns over
entrance controls at the national level.76 It was not just that the
rationale supporting local spatial controls shares commonalities
with those undergirding our nation's immigration powers. Rather,
much of the early attempts at local spatial organizing through
techniques like zoning complemented federal immigration
controversy by targeting immigrants specifically and were fueled
by many of the same sentiments that prompted federal restrictions
at our national borders." In other words, the immigration
dilemmas of the day were not being discussed solely through the
lens of federal immigration restrictions; reformers looked to local
spatial controls as well and often conceived of the national and
local components as parts of a comprehensive regulatory regime.
To be sure, land use regulations were far from the only
means through which attempts were made to influence the
residency of immigrants on the ground. Violence and
intimidation were extensively and effectively used, especially
against the Chinese immigrants along the west coast who, as a
result, were at times confined to certain quarters" or expelled
no excuse for indifference in regard to it on the part of any citizen."); see also
SCHLESINGER, supra note 70, at 387-420.
74. See MARTIN BULMER, THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF SOCIOLOGY 89 (1984) (noting the
emerging scientific "ecological" approach to determine how expansion affects the
"metabolism" of the city); SAM BASS WARNER, JR., THE PRIVATE CITY 4 (1968).
75. FISHMAN, supra note 70, at 118-19.
76. See EDWARD C. BANFIELD & JAMES Q. WILSON, CITY POLITICS 141 (4th prtg.
1967) (noting that in cities like Boston, "many leaders of [municipal] reform were leaders
of the Immigration Restriction League"); TEAFORD, supra note 42, at 84-85 (describing
the ethnic rifts and heightened immigration that brought about the demands for
restrictions on entry to the country).
77. See TEAFORD, supra note 42, at 84 ("The advent of zoning ordinances between
1910 and 1930 added legal imprimatur to the segregation of earlier decades.").
78. As one observer wrote in the early 1900s, Chinese "families would much prefer
to live outside of Chinatown but they cannot get quarters elsewhere at any price, no
matter how wealthy they may be nor how quiet and cleanly." MARY ROBERTS COOLIDGE,
CHINESE IMMIGRATION 437-38 (Arno Press 1969) (1909); see also VICTOR G. NEE & BRETT
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entirely from particular communities." Private contractual devices
such as racial restrictive covenants also played an important role
in stifling integration"o and were utilized decades later by federal
and private mortgage standards advising lenders against servicing
traditional immigrant communities and "newer neighborhoods if
they [were] 'infiltrated' by the wrong people."1 In many ways,
regulatory mechanisms like land use controls can be understood as
an extension of these extralegal or private arrangements. But like
immigration controls, they advanced these divisive and
exclusionary aims with the added imprimatur of legal legitimacy.
It is noteworthy then, as Seymour Toll observed in his
extensive history of municipal zoning in America, that "[tihe
immigrant is in the fiber of zoning."8 Indeed, some of the earliest
land use restrictions to be employed at the local level were those
enacted "to keep Chinese out of 'American' neighborhoods."" The
facts behind cases like Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Soon Hing v.
Crowley demonstrate how early municipal licensing and labor
requirements for laundries were often imposed for the "purpose
of compelling the subjects of China to quit and abandon their
business and residence in the city and county and State."8 4 Other
DE BARY NEE, LONGTIME CALIFORN' 60 (1973) ("The sense of being physically sealed
within the boundaries of Chinatown was impressed on the few immigrants coming into
the settlement by frequent stonings which occurred as they came up Washington or Clay
Street from the piers.").
79. See JEAN PFAELZER, DRIVEN OUT, at xv-xvi (2007) (describing the expulsion of
hundreds of Chinese immigrants from communities); see also ALEXANDER SAXTON, THE
INDISPENSABLE ENEMY 209 (1971) (describing how, through the use of both legal
measures and mob violence from 1885 to 1886, a rash of Chinese expulsions from cities
like Seattle and various other western towns "work[ed] decisive changes in the social
geography of the West"). Because many of the expelled were sent directly to San
Francisco, it was estimated that as a result of this campaign, the Chinese population in
San Francisco's Chinatown increased by 20,000 in a matter of three months. This was a
radical increase, as the number of Chinese residents in all of California was
approximately 75,000 during that time. See id. at 209-10. Of course, the Chinese were
hardly unique in being so treated. See, e.g., LAWRENCE HAROLD LARSEN & BARBARA J.
COTTRELL, THE GATE CITY 165-66 (1982) (describing the Greek Town Riot in 1909 that
led to the expulsion of the entire immigrant Greek community from the city of Omaha,
Nebraska).
80. Indeed, one of the very first racial restrictive covenant cases concerned a deed
requiring that the buyer "shall never, without .. . consent .. . rent any of the buildings or
ground owned by [him] . . . to a Chinaman or Chinamen." Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181,
181 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892).
81. DOUGLAs W. RAE, CITY: URBANISM AND ITS END 266, 272-74 (referring to the Home
Owners' Loan Corporation standards proposed and enacted as a part of the New Deal).
82. SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 29 (1969); WARNER, supra note 44, at 28
("The standard zoning ordinance of American cities was originally conceived from a union
of two fears-fear of the Chinese and fear of skyscrapers.").
83. LAWRENCE J. VALE, FROM THE PURITANS TO THE PROJECTS 116 (2000).
84. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 706 (1885); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356, 362-63 (1886).
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efforts, however, were more direct. Because Chinese launderers
often lived in or above their shops, concern about laundries was
often inseparable from alarm over Chinese residents." It is with
this in mind that Los Angeles passed ordinances that regulated
or outright prohibited the operation of laundries in certain
districts, while Modesto, also in California, quite literally
relegated them to the "'wrong' side of the tracks."8 6 Foregoing
proxies altogether, the regulatory escalation peaked in San
Francisco with the passage of the Bingham Ordinance, which
specifically forbade any Chinese resident from locating, residing,
or carrying on a business anywhere outside of a designated
district. 7
Despite the persistence of municipal officials, few of these
early restrictions survived judicial review; overt animus and
explicit targeting made them vulnerable under the emerging
equal protection jurisprudence.88  But the confluence of
immigration and the development of local spatial controls did not
end with these efforts. More recognizable forms of land use
zoning, which had initially sprouted in the West and with an
emphasis on land- and development-oriented restrictions,
blossomed in the urban centers of the eastern seaboard and the
burgeoning Midwest." Moreover, concerns about foreign
immigration continued to be an important motivation.
Take, for example, the ordinance that is most often
identified as the first comprehensive municipal zoning regime: a
1916 zoning plan passed by New York City that divided the city
into several districts and imposed various height and use
restrictions in each." Although concerns about the availability of
sunlight for pedestrians and skylight for office buildings played a
role, it was motivated in large part by alarm over the presence of
immigrant factory workers in "native" districts." In other words,
intimately tied to the concerns about skyscrapers was an "even
more explosive land-use battle" between the retail merchants and
85. See Gordon Whitnall, History of Zoning, ANNAlS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCI., May
1931, at 1, 9 ("Mhe regulation was unquestionably a move towards racial segregation.").
86. MEL Scorr, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 75 (1969).
87. See NAYAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES 71-72 (2001).
88. See, e.g., In re Lee Sing, 43 F. 359, 361 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1890) ("That this
ordinance is a direct violation, of, not only, the express provisions of the constitution of
the United States, in several particulars, but also of the express provisions of our several
treaties with China, and of the statutes of the United States, is so obvious, that I shall not
waste more time, or words in discussing the matter.").
89. See generally WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS (1985).
90. William R. Code, The Skyscraper: America's Building, in GEOGRAPHICAL
SNAPSHOTS OF NoRTH AMERICA 317, 319-20 (Donald G. Janelle ed., 1992).
91. DAvI A. JOHNSON, PLANNING THE GREAT METROPOLIS 37-38 (1996).
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their suppliers on Fifth Avenue, where the "'garment trades'
newest manufacturing-loft buildings arose close enough to the
department stores to threaten retail property values and offend
the stores' carriage-trade clientele, especially at the noon hour,
when immigrant workers flooded the shopping district."9 2 Thus,
for the Fifth Avenue Association that formed to lobby for
comprehensive zoning in New York, concerns about factories and
specific types of land use were never far from their concerns that
their sidewalks were "becom[ing] increasingly jammed with
immigrant, lower-class, foreign-speaking workers.""
Similar concerns can also be seen in the rise of the suburbs,
and the subsequent inter-municipal fragmentation that became
the basis of the modern metropolitan form. By the turn of the
twentieth century, immigrants were already disproportionately
concentrated in the central city." And notwithstanding the
promise of zoning in dividing neighborhoods, it was clear that "as
American cities swelled with a new immigrant population, the
single-class elite residential district" that many natives sought
were increasingly "incompatible with the urban core."" As a
consequence, not long after zoning was first introduced with the
endorsement of the National League of Cities and the federal
government, local spatial controls like zoning were not only
embraced for its ability to parse an existing community into
separate districts with the hopes of buffering "native"
neighborhoods from immigrants; when applied broadly and
uniformly across an entire community, it could serve to stifle
inter-municipal migration as well.
Indeed, although incorporating and moving into new
communities at the edge of the central city offered an immediate
escape, it was zoning that ensured its long-term viability. Thus,
notwithstanding Robert Fishman's initial impression that early
demographic "division [s] did not correspond to any political
boundary," municipal borders, and the legal regime that
accompanied them, played a crucial role.96 Many suburban
communities were incorporated specifically to secure the power
to zone, and many saw this as a means by which the political
92. JON A. PETERSON, THE BIRTH OF CITY PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1840-
1917, at 311 (2003).
93. JOHNSON, supra note 91, at 37; see also WARNER, supra note 44, at 30.
94. JACKSON, supra note 45, at 70 ("Although only one-third of all Americans lived
in cities in 1890, two-thirds of all immigrants did. By 1910, about 80 percent of all new
arrivals at Ellis Island were remaining in cities, as were 72 percent of all those "foreign
born.").
95. FISHMAN, supra note 70, at 120.
96. Id. at 151.
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boundaries of peripheral communities could be turned into
physical limitations on the spillover effects of the central cities."
Establishing a distinct political unit through incorporation
allowed groups to accomplish politically and collectively what
private contractual devices could achieve only through
substantial negotiations and coordinated action." In other words,
when it was clear that anti-immigration laws would do little to
"overcome the problem of the immigrant population already in
the cities ... [sluburbia loomed as the elitist political alternative
to urban democracy."" And with the legal tools to support these
motivations, it was not surprising that municipal and
neighborhood boundaries began to harden. As the noted urban
historian Sam Bass Warner observed, because of the proliferation
of "financial, racial, and ethnic limitation[s]" at the local level,
"Italians were held at bay in Boston, Poles in Detroit, blacks in
Chicago and St. Louis, Jews in New York."'
All of this took place before a backdrop of congressional and
popular debates over the merits of immigration and the need for
added restrictions. Just five years before New York City adopted
its comprehensive zoning ordinance, a special congressional
committee widely known after its chair as the Dillingham
Commission issued a cautionary forty-one-volume report on the
racial characteristics and living conditions of immigrants around
the country and recommending more immigration controls.'0 ' And
five years after New York's comprehensive zoning, Congress
followed the city's conservationist scheme by enacting the
nation's first comprehensive immigration law, the Emergency
Quota Act,'02 which not only established admission quotas based
on national origin, but eventually, in its 1924 iteration, fixed
those quotas to the national demography of an earlier
97. See William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 325-26 (2004).
98. See ROEDIGER, supra note 21, at 172-73 (describing the difficulty of establishing
what a local newspaper described as the "marvelous delicately woven chain of armor"
made of racial covenants in Hyde Park, Chicago).
99. SIDNEY PLOTKIN & WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, PRIVATE INTEREST, PUBLIC
SPENDING 121 (1994); see also FISHMAN, supra note 70, at 142 (describing the suburbs as
"a protected place where the true American family could prosper and reproduce itself
and, in doing so, "hold off the alien invasion"); Briffault, supra note 66, at 364 (noting that
many of these efforts were the result of the growing tension between older stock
Americans living in outlying areas and the poor immigrants who filled into many central
cities and secured urban political power).
100. WARNER, supra note 44, at 32.
101. See ROBERT F. ZEIDEL, IMMIGRANTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND EXCLUSION POLITICS
101-15 (2004).
102. Emergency Quota Act, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (1921).
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generation.'o In other words, the immigration debates over the
national demography were being played out at the same time
zoning and other mechanisms of spatial controls were being
implemented to protect the demographic composition and "ethnic
and social purity"'0 4 of existing neighborhoods and newly
incorporated communities. Moreover, the fact that in cities like
Boston "many leaders of [municipal] reform were leaders of the
Immigration Restriction League" shows that the catalysts behind
both movements were intrinsically intertwined, if not often one
and the same.' 5 As Constance Perin observed, "The premise of
both social movements was that it was legitimate and important
as part of the public business to make fine discriminations
among the attributes of social groups and social space."'
Reflecting on this history, it is worth noting that the
concurrent rise of comprehensive immigration legislation and the
rapid spread of land use controls should not be reduced to a
narrative of anti-immigrant sentiment and the overarching
politics of avoidance. Not only did they operate on different scales,
but what is unique about their near-simultaneous emergence was
the fact that they were both mutually reinforcing and mutually
contingent. The concentric districts to which zoning and other
spatial controls gave legal and institutional shape, and which
early social scientists observed, drew upon immigration
distinctions to become a naturalized and ecological form of social
organization. While at the same time, understood in this regard
not only as a barometer through which immigration incorporation
can be measured, but also as a gauge of our nation's
assimilationist capacity, this spatial geography formed the basis
103. See TICHENOR, supra note 24, at 144-45. Even this demographic reconstruction
was heavily doctored for use as a reference point. See Mae M. Ngai, The Architecture of
Race in American Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 1924, 86
J. AM. HIST. 67, 72 (1999).
104. TEAFORD, supra note 42, at 11-12. As Teaford noted, while social and
economic segregation were rare in the early nineteenth century, the rift became
increasingly spatially apparent when "[middle-class urban dwellers ... grew
increasingly isolated from America's poor as they used the streetcar to commute far
from the abhorrent Irish and their saloons, the Germans and their beer gardens, and
the alien Slavs." Id. at 11. It was for this reason that Oak Park, a suburb of Chicago
and populated with "upper-middle-class, Protestant, American-born residents," decided
in the early 1900s to "incorporate independently, severing governmental ties with the
increasing number of foreign-born, working-class Roman Catholics in [now neighboring]
Cicero." Id. at 23.
105. Amy Bridges & Richard Kronick, Writing the Rules to Win the Game: The
Middle-Class Regimes of Municipal Reformers, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 691, 697 (1999).
106. PERIN, supra note 10, at 196; see also Frug, supra note 64, at 254 (critiquing the
traditional "modeling [of] cities on the autonomous individual and the nation-state,"




for federal action and further efforts at finer delineations, which
not only rationalized these local divisions, but also encouraged
their proliferation. This is not to say that lines of ethnicity, class,
or religion would not exist except through these institutional
constraints. To the contrary, these delineations indicate that
various institutional structures shape the contours and
significance of these divisions, while at the same time buttress one
another from the inside. And the fact that immigrant enclaves
continue to attract such attention, even while American society as
a whole continues to fragment along traditional and increasingly
more refined lines,o' shows the extent to which the constitutive
relationship between immigration and local geography remains.
Of course, that spatial and boundary controls can lead to
new delineations among individuals or elevate identifiable
differences to new significance alludes to the communal
identifications that institutional divisions can engender. It is to
this that we now turn.
B. Community, Immigration, and the Internalization of
Membership Controls
Spatial jurisdictions, once defined, also serve as the basis for
defining communities and the criteria and significance of
membership in those communities: "[Bloundary lines not only
determine which public resources are ours and which are theirs,
but help to define who 'we' and 'they' are.""0s Of course, just as
this nation is fractured spatially, it is also subdivided in terms of
collective sentiments and public obligations. As this Section
illustrates, the interplay between these political and legal
institutions of community and membership reflect another aspect
of the immigration-localism relationship.
My focus here is on the legal and historic ties between the
local and national definitions of membership and community-
namely, the relationship between the institution of national
citizenship and local residency. Again, before reaching this, we
begin by looking at how these issues have traditionally been
understood in the immigration context.
1. The Multiple Significance of Community. Membership
and community have long been bedrock issues in the
immigration discourse. If "[t]he primary good that we distribute
107. See, e.g., BLAKELY & SNYDER, supra note 11, at 55 (describing golf and leisure
communities); 1ICHAEL E. HUNT, RETIREMENT COMMUNITIES 112, 179 (1984) (describing
age-restricted senior-only communities).
108. FRUG, supra note 10, at 115.
2010] 391
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
to one another is membership in some human community,"10
then it is no surprise that the distributional consequences of our
immigration and naturalization laws regularly rank among the
nation's most pressing and contentious concerns. For all their
importance, however, recognition of the role of community and
membership has been relatively limited; in most instances
"membership" is equated with national citizenship, and the only
relevant "community" is assumed to be the national polity."' To
be sure, significant efforts have been made in recent decades to
move beyond the nation-state model by looking "up" and "out" in
the direction of the global and transnational."' Yet even in a
world of increasing migration and transnational exchange of
capital, commodities, and culture, there remains a sense that the
grand visions of the global village or cosmopolitan citizenship fail
to capture how immigration is understood by migrants and
natives alike."2
Indeed, a rich narrative can also be told by looking "down"
and "within." With respect to its target and beneficiaries, the
foundation of immigration controls is inextricably tied to the
institution of citizenship and the nation-state. But the
complexities surrounding immigration specifically (and mobility
more generally) have long bolstered the need for intermediate
affiliations that lie between the archetypes of the citizen and the
alien. Thus, although the Supreme Court held to the citizen-
noncitizen divide of the former by famously noting in Mathews v.
Diaz that "[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization
and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens," the case was ultimately
decided on the basis of the latter-with respect to the spectrum
of intermediate positions between those two poles and Congress's
ability to take into account the changing "character of the
relationship between the alien and this country" and respond
differently "as the alien's tie grows stronger." 3 That the
109. WALZER, supra note 38, at 31.
110. See Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A
Response to David Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 239-46 (1983) (recommending a
shift from the usual focus on national community and polity to a focus on community
ties).
111. See Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference That Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1070-74 (1994); see also Ed Wingenbach, Justice After
Liberalism: Democracy and Global Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP AFTER LIBERALISM 147,
160 (Karen Slawner & Mark E. Denham eds., 1998); Richard Falk, The Making of Global
Citizenship, in GLOBAL VISIONS 39, 39 (Jeremy Brecher et al. eds., 1993).
112. See, e.g., MICHAEL PETER SMITH, TRANSNATIONAL URBANISM 106-10, 169-71
(2001).
113. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976).
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competing interests and values at stake in the regulation of
immigration would compel increasingly detailed attention to be
paid to other semblances of membership has not gone unnoticed;
numerous commentators have traced the role of affiliations
intermediate between the stark dichotomy of citizens and
noncitizens that permeate immigration law and policy."4
These affiliations, of course, are not entirely abstract.
Indeed, in many instances, they are located in the relationships
and practices associated with communal life in neighborhoods,
towns, and cities across the country. To be sure, as we saw in the
discussion of the spatial assimilation model, not all communities
are held up or privileged in the same way."' Nor has local
attentiveness translated into formal decentralization of power, as
is the case in other countries."6 But our nation's immigration
policy has long been construed as a means of protecting local
communities. Writing about urbanism in an increasingly
transnational world, Michael Peter Smith critiqued the tendency
of urban scholars to embrace an idealized and often simplified
vision of local communities-one that presents them as the stable
domestic core of a nation that is at once detached from
transnational influences and flows, and thus in need of protection
from globalization's destabilizing effects."m However, this is
precisely the view that is often taken with respect to immigration
regulations. We saw this approach in our discussion of Chinese
exclusion and the rise of the plenary power doctrine in the latter
half of the nineteenth century. And it continues to be relevant
today: as a recent Senate Judiciary Committee report explained,
our immigration law revolves around whether Americans are
willing to accept "aliens into their day-to-day life experiences,"
and strives to only admit nationally those newcomers whose
subsequent admission "to a community do not excessively disrupt
or change the attributes of the community which make it familiar
to its residents and uniquely their 'home.""'"
114. See MOTOMURA, supra note 25, at 80-95; PETER H. SCHUCK, CITIZENS,
STRANGERS, AND IN-BETWEENS 21, 76-80 (1998); Aleinikoff, supra note 110, at 244; David
A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political Asylum
and Beyond, 44 U. PIr. L. REV. 165, 230 (1983).
115. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Jeffrey G. Reitz, Canada: Immigration and Nation-Building in the
Transition to a Knowledge Economy, in CONTROLLING IMMIGRATION 123 (Wayne A.
Cornelius et al. eds., 2d ed. 2004) (describing the strong provincial role with respect to
immigration in Canada); see also Uta Harnischfeger, Swiss to Decide on Whether Local
Secret Votes on Citizenship Are Final, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2008, at A19 (describing the
requirement of local community approval for naturalization in Switzerland).
117. SMITH, supra note 112, at 102-06.
118. S. REP. No. 98-62, at 3-4 (1983).
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But if the local community has been invoked as a reason for
immigrant exclusion in policymaking, its actual role with respect
to immigration is more than balanced by the manner in which
local membership and affiliation have also served as substitutes
for citizenship on the ground. Arguing that local membership and
its focus on the relations of everyday life are inherently more
inclusive as a basis for community than the detached institution
of national citizenship, Professor Aleinikoff maintains that
progressive activists would do better to reframe the immigration
debates around a local perspective."' Similarly, Professor
Rodriguez concludes that, because of its unique capacity, the
local role with respect to immigration is particularly suited for
the important task of integration.1 20 Though presented for the
most part as normative proposals, it is not difficult to find traces
of these accounts in our immigration laws as well. Community
ties and local affiliations have influenced how legal lines have
been drawn for the purposes of due process in immigration
proceedings.1 2' Also notable is the role that community ties and
local affiliations have historically played with respect to
discretionary relief from deportation,'22 which often turned on
assessments of the standing of a potential deportee in his
community.'23 The most prominent example today, however, is
the emergence of the so-called local "sanctuary" movement.
Spurred in part by the sense that resident immigrants,
119. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Geography of Citizenship, Raven Lecture on
Access to Justice at Georgetown University Law Center 8-9 (Mar. 16, 2006),
http://issc.berkeley.edu/media/documents/pdf/Aleinikoff Lecture.pdf.
120. See Rodriguez, supra note 7, at 581.
121. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (describing how the
development of ties of residency changes the constitutional status of immigrants for the
purpose of due process); see also MOTOMURA, supra note 25, at 102-03 (discussing the
effect of affiliational ties on the procedural due process rule in Kwong Hai Chew v.
Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953)).
122. See Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the
Undocumented Worker Under United States Law, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 955, 983 n.113.
Compare Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1980) ("The Board [of
Immigration Appeals] should consider Villena's contribution to his community in ruling
on his application. . . . [H]is involvement in such projects does support his allegation
that he has become integrated into the American culture."), with Carnalla-Munoz v.
INS, 627 F.2d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding no "extreme hardship" because
"petitioners speak primarily Spanish, and they have presented no evidence of
involvement in community affairs . .. or other evidence of integration into American
culture").
123. See Santana-Figueroa v. INS, 644 F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversing
denial of discretionary relief in part because of agency's failure to consider the fact that
"the petitioner regularly attended church for at least ten years, had close friends here,
and ... [h]is priest wrote that he had been 'an asset to [the] church and community"),
superseded by statute, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009.
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irrespective of their legal status, are nevertheless a part of their
community, and by concerns with the fiscal and social costs of
immigrant enforcement, some localities have promulgated
policies instructing local officials not to cooperate with federal
immigration authorities in certain circumstances,"' while others
have expressed opposition more informally through protests
against federal raids and other disruptive enforcement efforts.'2 '
Focusing on the sanctuary movement, however, reveals
another facet of the role of local communities and local
membership that is not often acknowledged. In turn, it also
uncovers an aspect of local affiliations that is frequently
overlooked. Noting that sanctuaries "share a lot of features with
prisons," one commentator opined that "[s]anctuaries are not
generally liberating; they shelter the body of the seeker at the
price of his liberty and freedom of movement."'26 Echoes of this
can be heard in the words of a Guatemalan migrant insulated in
part by the sanctuary policy of Los Angeles: "A visa or green card
is required to leave the Los Angeles area.. . . If you are illegal,
you don't have freedom of movement."'2 7 This remark illuminates
the tension inherent in the idea of sanctuary. It is also
recognition of the fact that sanctuary policies do not emerge from
communities defined by interpersonal relations and communal
sentiments. Rather, they are governmental policies espoused by
localities with defined jurisdictional boundaries and specific
criteria of membership. In other words, if sanctuary policies
illustrate how subnational membership can protect one from
national exclusion, it also illustrates how the bounds of
subnational membership can limit one's scope of association. In
this respect, local communities and local citizenship are not
unlike the institutions which they supplement: as an
intermediate "inside" between the binary of citizenship, local
membership also forms the basis for an intermediate "outside";
as an alternative basis for inclusion, it also serves as another
ground for exclusion. Thus, to the extent the availability of
"sanctuary" depends on how community ties and intermediate
affiliations are channeled through membership in local
124. See generally Pham, supra note 7, at 1381-95 (2006).
125. See, e.g., Jessie Mangaliman, Police Practice Questioned in Lawsuit, OAKLAND
TRIB., Apr. 9, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 6797915 ("At least five Bay Area cities-San
Jose, East Palo Alto, San Francisco, Richmond and San Rafael-have passed city
resolutions in recent months denouncing federal agents' sweeps to round up illegal
immigrants in northern California.").
126. William Ian Miller, Sanctuary, Redlight Districts, and Washington, D.C.: Some
Observations on Neuman's Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1235, 1244 (1996).
127. SUSAN BIBLER COUTIN, LEGALIZING MOVES 33 (2000) (footnote omitted).
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communities, we must once again consider the legal aspects of
this organization.
2. The Consequences of Local Membership. One need not
probe too far beneath the surface of our nationalistic ideals to find
ways in which the traditional duality of nation-state citizenship
and noncitizenship is complicated by other nuanced markers of
belonging in American society. Divisions of race, class, gender,
religion, and sexual orientation, to name a few, fracture our sense
of national affiliation and personal identification. At the same
time, one need not go too far down the institutional structure of
this nation to find legal criteria of membership that enable,
expand, and complicate these divisions in interesting ways.
Throughout history, the significance of intermediate legal statuses
(like state citizenship 2 8 and tribal membership29 ) have ebbed and
flowed. Of particular note here is the institution of local
citizenship, which has steadily gained importance even while its
prominence has receded in an increasingly mobile world.
In some ways, local citizenship is less permanent and more
fluid than other markers or institutions of belonging.
Membership in local communities often requires no more than
residency. Thus, relinquishing or acquiring such membership can
often be effectuated with a simple change of one's home. At the
same time, its organizing role is significant. Membership at the
local level is complicated by social and legal restrictions to inter-
municipal mobility, such as those examined previously.
Moreover, notwithstanding the relatively informal manner by
which local membership is acquired, consequences of gaining
such legal status can be quite transformative. Taxes, quality of
life, and access to valuable services like education all depend on
the community of which one is a resident and thus a member.
This is especially true given that localities have traditionally
been afforded substantial power to distinguish between residents
and nonresidents, and treat differently those who are legally a
part of the community from those who are merely present."0 Of
128. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 516-20 (1999) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(summarizing the legal significance of state citizenship and arguing that Saenz
represents a shift); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 64 (1996).
129. See, e.g., Roberta Haines, U.S. Citizenship and Tribal Membership: A Contest
for Political Identity and Rights of Tribal Self-Determination in Southern California, 21
AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RESEARCH J. (ISSUE 3) 211 (1997).
130. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328-29 (1983) ("A bona fide residence
requirement, appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers the substantial state
interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are enjoyed only by
residents. ... A bona fide residence requirement simply requires that the person does
establish residence before demanding the services that are restricted to residents.").
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course, courts in the past have at times been unwilling to elevate
local membership to the level of a personal or associational right,
especially against the state."' But changing social contexts have
also led to changing judicial tones, and recent decisions have
increasingly sounded a more deferential orientation to
arguments based on communal cohesion and local self-
determination.'
On the one hand, the "feeling of belongingness, oneness,
solidarity, and affective connection" that local membership
instills should not be underestimated."' Though at times
described as an administrative classification,'34 the legal status of
local membership also conveys and reinforces a strong sense of
personal and communal identity. This is not to say that in today's
world, legal membership in a local community accurately
captures the whole or even bulk of our communal attachments;
for most of us, labels like "friends" and "strangers" describe
individuals on both sides of the municipal line, and interpersonal
relations and communal experiences arise just as regularly in
surrounding communities as our own. But too often the law's
fixation on residency encourages regional relationships, like
those between cities and suburbs for most of the twentieth
century, to be cast through the lens of "us" and "them."'"' Indeed,
many have commented on the particular "consciousness" that
membership in a particular segment of a fragmented metropolis
brings about.136
On the other hand, it is important to recognize that the
transformative consequences of local membership also extend
beyond mere feelings. In a world where communal sentiments
form the basis for not only the allocation of individual rights and
personal entitlements, but also mutual responsibilities and
collective obligations, such feelings play an important role in the
131. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 176-79 (1907) (rejecting
claim that residency is a personal contractual right that can be exercised against the
state).
132. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 486-87 (1982)
(protecting local decisionmaking and political processes against state interference); see
also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
133. FRUG, supra note 10, at 57.
134. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1978)
(describing states' authority to confer power upon municipalities); see also Richard T.
Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 850, 860-61
(1999).
135. See JACKSON, supra note 45, at 272-73, 277-78.
136. See, e.g., M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB 11 (1988)
(describing suburban culture as revolving around "avoidance" and "moral minimalism");
FRUG, supra note 10, at 119-22 (describing the "psychology" of city life).
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distribution of valuable material'3 7 and social... resources. As
Walzer explains: "Membership is important because of what the
members of a political community owe to one another and to no
one else, or to no one else in the same degree.""' Translated into
practice, divisions of local membership have not only been
invoked to sanction the widespread practice of restricting access
to public goods like local public schools to those who are not
members of the community,140 but also to justify unequal
educational funding structures in order to avoid interlocal
redistribution or the loss of local control.'4' Indeed, along with
schools, access to public goods and services like police protection,
health and social services, and other public amenities, and the
tax base from which funding for these can be derived, have been
described as the "value" of having residence, and thus
membership, in a given community.'4 2 To use the language of one
such service, membership rules define, in effect, who is being
policed and for whom there is policing.4 3
As the basis for communal sentiments and as a mechanism
for collective redistribution, it is not surprising that background
legal rules governing the structure of local communities and the
significance of acquiring membership have tilted communal
organization toward a system of fragmented homogeneity. As far
back as Euclid, Justice Sutherland defended the rise of zoning
restrictions prohibiting apartment housing by describing
apartments as "parasite[s], constructed in order to take
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings
created by the residential character of [al district."'" Today,
concerns about residential "free riders" who pay less than they
137. See BURNS, supra note 42, at 4-9 (explaining the role of local governments in
providing services to citizens).
138. See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility
and the Many Faces of Social Capital, 9 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 177, 179-80 (1998)
(describing effect of residency on the amount and type of social capital that is available).
139. WALZER, supra note 38, at 64.
140. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1983) (approving residency
requirements for public school attendance).
141. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973)
(holding inequitable local school funding constitutional); Belier v. Wilson, 147 P. 355, 356
(Colo. 1915) (striking down effort to redistribute local taxes for educational funding on
state constitutional grounds).
142. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 45-46 (2001) (noting
that a wide range of local characteristics and policies are capitalized in the price of
housing).
143. See Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 777, 797 (2000) (stating that police often understand their job to mean protecting the
"'nice' neighborhoods" and the "'decent' people").
144. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926).
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receive in local goods and thus fail to properly internalize those
costs 45 have placed a high premium on development policies that
successfully segment communal membership to limit
redistributive effects and cluster those who seek similar
services.146 The result is that while federal and state governments
are increasingly looked upon as institutionally situated to engage
in collective action and progressive redistribution, local
governments have been oriented in the opposite direction."'
In this respect, the legal and ideological institution of local
membership shares many of the hallmarks of national
citizenship and its role in our system of immigration controls.
The oneness and belonging associated with citizenship constitute
an important aspect of how immigration policies are crafted. In
addition, immigration debates are never far from more
materialist concerns such as how a nation's "bounty" is to be
shared. Indeed, whether understood as a relic of "feudal
privilege"148 or a necessary foundation of modern society, the
incentive structure created by the global order of citizenship
explains much of the features and organizational structure of
nation-states in ways that mirror those of our more intimate
lived environments.
But the connection between national and local citizenship is
also more direct. This is particularly true with respect to the actual
concerns being raised in today's immigration debates. Some of the
strongest and most accepted arguments are over the costs and
benefits of immigration,'49 especially those focused "almost single-
mindedly on immigrants as a tax burden."' These fears center on
a few specific areas: overcrowded schools and the cost of educating
immigrants and their children; overcrowded prisons and the cost
of policing immigrant communities; and overcrowded emergency
145. See ROBERT J. DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS 71 (1992) (defining free riders
as those who "make full use of the goods and services without paying for them").
146. See Bryan Ellickson, Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice, 61
AM. ECON. REV. 334, 337-38 (1971) (acknowledging the tendency of certain suburban
areas to "stratify by occupational class"); Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property
Taxation in a System of Local Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 206-07 (1975)
(suggesting that households seek communities that yield the "highest attainable level of
utility").
147. See BURNS, supra note 42, at 80 (positing that, in the course of three and a half
decades, "new cities changed from being providers of services to being providers of lower
taxes").
148. Carens, supra note 38, at 230.
149. See KENT A. ONO & JOHN M. SLOOP, SHIFTING BORDERS 29-32 (2002) (stating
that the argument most commonly made by the mainstream media concerning
Proposition 187 involved the cost of undocumented immigrants to California's economy).
150. Kitty Calavita, The New Politics of Immigration: "Balanced-Budget
Conservatism" and the Symbolism of Proposition 187, 43 SOc. PROBS. 284, 284-85 (1996).
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rooms and the cost of providing health care to uninsured
immigrants.' It is interesting then that although federal
solutions are sought, many of the services at issue are provided
primarily by local government entities from local property tax
receipts or state aid and in accordance with state law."2
The point of highlighting this is not simply to say, as many
in the immigration debates now trumpet, that "the positive fiscal
impact [of immigration] tends to accrue at the federal level, while
net costs tend to be concentrated at the state and local level.""'
Rather, it is to recognize that because local jurisdictions are
primarily responsible, local community and membership rules
exempt many individuals from these burdens, while
concentrating the cost of this responsibility in the hands of
others. Thus, even if national boundary and membership rules
determine the immigrants who are entitled to share in our
"bounty," and the "bounty" to which they are entitled, local
community controls ultimately decide which individuals are
primarily responsible by defining the "community" from which
these obligations arise and what membership in such
communities entails. Again, this is not an unexpected byproduct
of our system of local governance. Rather, it is a fundamental
component of our definition of local membership.
3. The Shared History of Community Fragmentation. Again,
beyond similarities in their logic and operations, the relationship
between national and local conceptualization of community and
membership can also be found in their historic development. Not
unlike the spatial analysis above, the turn of the twentieth century
is a pivotal era for our inquiry. Common roots in the communal
context, however, can arguably be traced back even further.
151. See ICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 399 (Univ. of Pa. Press 2008)
(2001); PETER SCHRAG, CALIFORNIA: AMERICA'S HIGH-STAKES EXPERIMENT 50 (2006);
TICHENOR, supra note 24, at 291.
152. See Cynthia Webb Brooks, Health Care Reform, Immigration Laws, and
Federally Mandated Medical Services: Impact of Illegal Immigration, 17 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
141, 141-42 (1994) ("While the federal government maintains exclusive control over
immigration policies, state and local governments must pay for many federally mandated
medical and educational services, regardless of citizenship."); Su, supra note 9, at 1665-
77. This could explain why the 1996 federal welfare reform act, which foreclosed
immigrants from being eligible for many federal means-tested assistance programs, did
not quiet the economic tax burden anxieties with regard to immigration in any significant
way. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, §§ 400-451, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-76 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
153. Robert Pear, White House Report Lauds Immigrants' Positive Effects, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A17 (quoting COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, IMMIGRATION'S ECONOMIC IMPACT 5 (2007)).
400 [ 47: 2
LOCAL FRAGMENTATION
Indeed, some of the earliest immigration enforcement efforts
after this country's founding emerged from attempts to organize
and maintain distinct communal spheres of membership at the
local level and avoid having to support another community's
resident. As Professor Burns observed, early American towns
possessed broad powers to determine which newly arrived
resident in their community would be formally recognized as an
inhabitant under "settlement laws" and other regulatory
measures.154  The review processes involved were quite
extraordinary-requiring at times that applicants supply written
references from leaders in their previous community in their
application to gain settlement in a new community.' 5 The
operative concerns, however, are quite familiar: fear of social
disorder and redistributive obligations prompted vigilance
against "straggling and indigent persons" in Delaware, "diverse
idle and disorderly persons" in North Carolina,"' and anyone who
"may prove chargeable to the town" in Massachusetts.
Of particular note was the fact that removal for lack of
settlement was employed for the same reasons and in the same
manner regardless of whether it involved "individuals from
neighboring towns, other colonies, [or] places 'beyond sea."'m8
Thus, of the 1,039 individuals that were "warned out" of Boston
in 1791, 740 came from other towns in Massachusetts, 62 from
other states, and 237 from foreign countries."' The underlying
logic was overtly communal in nature-the question of entry was
directly tied to the question of membership. 6' But state and
national citizenship had little relevance in this local
determination. Indeed, this particular view of belonging was
quite typical up to this time and by no means restricted to the
colonial experience: "Historical evidence indicates clearly that,
well into the nineteenth century, people routinely regarded as
'foreign' those from the next province every bit as much as those
who came from other 'countries."'
154. BURNS, supra note 42, at 45-46.
155. Id. at 45; see also Douglas Lamar Jones, The Strolling Poor: Transiency in
Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 8 J. Soc. HIST. 28, 42-43 (1975).
156. BURNS, supra note 42, at 45.
157. Id. at 35-36 (quoting SUMNER CHILTON POWELL, PURITAN VILLAGE 94 (1963)).
158. Kunal M. Parker, State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of
Immigrants in Antebellum Massachusetts, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 583, 588 (2001).
159. Id. at 597-98.
160. See Robert J. Steinfeld, Subjectship, Citizenship, and the Long History of
Immigration Regulation, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 645, 647 (2001) (describing the "well-
established tradition of using [state and local] citizenship (subjectship) as refusal").
161. TIM CRESSWELL, ON THE MOVE 13 (2006).
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It is often assumed that this early emphasis on regulating
local settlement faded with the increasing prominence of the
162state and later federal governments, especially as they became
more involved in social and economic policies. As exemplified by
T.H. Marshall's famous evolutionary account of citizenship, not
only does nation-state citizenship come to dominate the narrative
of political membership, but the overwhelming emphasis is often
on its slow but steady expansion."' To be sure, the nature of local
citizenship did change with the increasing significance of state
and, more importantly, national citizenship. But it is not clear
that its role or utility diminished. Rather, it can be said that the
confluence of developments central to the birth of America as a
modern nation-state were also instrumental in reinventing and
reinvigorating the significance of local membership at a time
when the ease of mobility and pace of transformation should
have rendered it obsolete. One such development is now familiar:
the great wave of immigration that peaked in the early twentieth
century. Another, which we have only touched upon, was the
expansion of municipal services, programs, and infrastructure
being provided and funded at the local level."*
Massive urbanization in the late nineteenth century led
cities across the country to begin undertaking public projects and
providing public services that became possible with their
improved economies of scale and necessary to maintain and
accommodate their economic and demographic growth. At first,
like the process of urbanization itself, this trend had a strong
centralizing effect. The availability of city amenities, especially
sewer, water, and later electricity, encouraged developing
suburban communities at the central city's periphery to seek
consolidation to gain access.165 As city services expanded to
include more social programs like public education and policing,
however, and as suburban communities gained independent
means to access the services that they desired,'66 the trend slowly
began to turn the other way. Maintaining a separate communal
identity meant that certain public goods in neighboring
communities may be unavailable. But it also meant that the
responsibility for providing other goods need not be shared. And
162. See JON C. TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES 8-10 (2002) (describing the
evolution of the state and federal governments).
163. See generally T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950).
164. See BURNS, supra note 42, at 47; see also JON C. TEAFORD, THE UNHERALDED
TRIUMPH 217-19 (1984).
165. See RICHARDSON DILWORTH, THE URBAN ORIGINS OF SUBURBAN AUTONOMY 23-
24 (2005).
166. See TEAFORD, supra note 42, at 82.
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with the increasing number of states changing their laws to
facilitate the incorporation of new communities at the edge of
existing cities, and the resistance to annexation after becoming
an independent entity, institutional avoidance of this sort
became a legally viable response.167
Of course, the institutional separation of the urban and the
suburban did not erase their functional interdependence. The
fact that suburban residents depended on the central city for
crucial "amenities" like work, commerce, and recreation meant
that these divisions were, in many respects, artificial.168 The
practical consequences of this strategy, however, were quite real.
The new suburban residents "understood that by separating
themselves into distinct political jurisdictions they could
monopolize the benefits of urban capitalism, benefits produced by
the city's giant working populations, while excluding the social
costs of reproducing labor, costs of public education, sanitation,
transportation, housing, fire, and police.""' In other words,
"suburbanites could work and get their income from the city,
avoid the city's property taxes that paid for things like public
schools and public baths for immigrants and other poor people,
and devote the suburbs' property taxes exclusively to benefits for
the relatively affluent and primarily white suburbanites."7 o
The controversy surrounding the annexation efforts of the
City of Boston during the 1880s typifies this transition.
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, Boston had steadily
and successfully annexed its surrounding towns, many of which
sought the services and amenities that only the central city could
offer at that time.'7 ' When a series of legislative and technological
changes enabled similar services to be delivered to smaller
suburban communities without the need for political
consolidation, the balance changed. As Sam Bass Warner
explained, with the "motive of services having been withdrawn,
there remained only the idea of community."172 This idea,
167. See Briffault, supra note 66, at 358-59.
168. Cf FISHMAN, supra note 70, at 26 ("Every true suburb is the outcome of two
opposing forces, an attraction toward the opportunities of the great city and a
simultaneous repulsion against urban life.").
169. PLOTKIN & SCHEUERMAN, supra note 99, at 123-24; see also BURNS, supra note
42, at 62; JACKSON, supra note 45, at 150-51.
170. ALAN RABINOwITz, URBAN ECONOMICS AND LAND USE IN AMERICA 62 (2004); see
also HALL, supra note 44, at 293. This is further complicated by the fact that many of the
start-up costs of suburbanization, such as capital expenditures related to local services,
were often subsidized by the city dwellers who did not move to the edge. See JACKSON,
supra note 45, at 130-32 (describing how such costs were paid by the city as a whole).
171. See SAM B. WARNER, JR., STREETCAR SUBURBS 163 (Atheneum 1969) (1962).
172. Id. at 164.
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however, proved to be both an inclusive and exclusive concept.
Those who advocated for continued annexation appealed to the
idea of "one great city where work and home, social and cultural
activities, industry, and commerce would be joined in a single
political union.""' Nevertheless, for many middle-class
suburbanites who had moved to these outlying communities from
Boston precisely to avoid the city, this unifying theme fell on deaf
ears. More persuasive were the annexation critics, who "point[ed]
out that the high level of city services maintained by Boston
meant higher taxes, and ... that independent suburban towns
could maintain native American life free from Boston's waves of
incoming poor immigrants." 7 4
It is not surprising that the influx of poor immigrant laborers
into the urban centers was an important reason why native-born
Americans sought the refuge of suburban communities and then
began to staunchly resist incorporation into the central city
through annexation. But it is also interesting to note that much of
the rhetoric surrounding suburbanization as a form of communal
negotiation, with respect to social and economic resources, echoed
similar motivations in the crafting of our immigration laws,
especially those that viewed immigration as a mechanism for
importing readily available labor without the associated cost of
having to grow it domestically. Both can be looked upon as means
by which communal identities served as tools for internalizing
and externalizing various costs and benefits of social and
economic life.'7 In this regard, the various scales on which we
define membership and community were not simply one way by
which we managed the costs and benefits of immigration, but
also an example of how we sought to redefine these costs and
benefits entirely. Indeed, if it is true, as many economists posit,
that immigration benefits the nation by increasing the supply of
labor and imposes costs primarily in public sector goods like
education, public benefits, and other community services and
resources, then it is noteworthy that from a very early stage,
community controls were fashioned to disproportionately
concentrate these costs among certain subsets of the population-
often upon the immigrants themselves-without unduly limiting
access to their labor or services to other segments of the nation.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see also LAWRENCE W. KENNEDY, PLANNING THE CITY UPON A HILL 67-69
(1992).
175. See PERIN, supra note 10, at 200 ("Today, the pervasive belief among most
suburban communities, buttressed by cost-revenue analyses, is that new arrivals cost




C. The Continuing Legacy of Joint Controls
Much has changed in the years following the history of space
and membership recounted above. For one, although the legal
roots of the fragmentation of American society can be found in
the response to foreign immigration, they truly matured in
response to a different wave of migrant newcomers: rural blacks
participating in the Great Migration from the South."6 With the
near cessation of immigration following the "closing" of our
borders in the 1920s and the Great Depression in the 1930s, the
tainted legacy of local spatial and community controls is best
observed in the ubiquitous black ghetto rather than any lingering
immigrant enclaves. It is also important to acknowledge the
degree to which the urban-suburban divide has evolved in more
recent decades as well. Whether discussed from the perspective
of race, class, or function, the line between suburbs and the
central city are no longer clear: urban neighborhoods are
gentrifying,"' many inner-ring suburbs are in rapid decline,"8
and several peripheral communities are becoming independent
nodes of commercial and industrial development while
abandoned industrial zones in the urban core are now being
converted for residential use.'79
At the same time, it can be argued that much is the same.
The impetus to differentiate that gave rise to land use controls
and communal fragmentation continues to garner political and
legal support, especially when justified, as it is increasingly
today, in the "neutral" language of local control, consumer
preference, or market efficiency. The relationship between the
center and the periphery may be changing in some areas,8 0 but
interlocal conflicts, including those between old and new suburbs,
remain strong.'' Moreover, with the reopening of our door to
176. CHARLES ABRAMS, THE CITY IS THE FRONTIER 55 (1965) (noting that when "the
Negro had been a small and docile minority in the North, it was the European immigrant,
not the Negro, against whom the established whites would spend their resentments," but
that the influx of black residents following the cessation of immigration caused the outcry
from natives and former immigrants to be redirected to this new flow).
177. See Rebecca R. Sohmer & Robert E. Lang, Downtown Rebound, in 1 REDEFINING
URBAN AND SUBURBAN AMERICA 63, 63-64 (Bruce Katz & Robert E. Lang eds., 2003)
(analyzing data from the 2000 census).
178. See generally ALAN BERUBE & ELIZABETH KNEEBONE, BROOKINGS INST., TwO
STEPS BACK: CITY AND SUBURBAN POVERTY TRENDS 1999-2005 (2006).
179. See JOEL GARREAU, EDGE CITY 3 (1988); JON C. TEAFORD, POST-SUBURBIA 5-6 (1997).
180. For example, Minneapolis is actually redistributing funds out of the city to the
suburbs under regional revenue sharing. See ELISE M. BRIGHT, REVIVING AMERICA'S
FORGOTTEN NEIGHBORHOODS 40 (2003).




immigration in the 1960s, echoes of an earlier era of spatial and
community segmentation can be seen once again in the
residential geography of the newest immigrant groups and its
legal significance. Although the incidence of segregation of recent
Hispanic and Asian immigrants still falls short of that
experienced by blacks today, measures for these new groups are
trending upwards even while those for blacks are (slowly) moving
in the opposite direction. As some commentators have already
observed, the "segregation levels experienced by a new cohort of
recent immigrants [are] remarkably similar to those observed in
1910" at the height of the first wave of immigration.12 Moreover,
instead of just being divided into different neighborhoods,
increasingly this fragmentation is translating into membership
in different communities, and thus distinct pools of public
obligation and collective action altogether.
It is not difficult to see the spate of state and local responses
to immigrant residency in recent years, especially with respect to
those deemed to be illegally present, as being a big part of this
ongoing narrative. Traditional local regulations, and traditionally
local interests, are being invoked once again to address the
contemporary immigration crisis, with housing code sweeps like
those in "Operation Firestorm" aimed at expelling immigrant
residents. and anti-loitering ordinances in communities like the
Village of Mamaroneck targeting congregations of immigrant day
laborers.'8 4 Popularized by the example of the City of Hazleton in
Pennsylvania, other communities have sought to go even further
by incorporating federal immigration laws directly into local
business licensing regulations, landlord-tenant ordinances, or
local eligibility requirements for public goods and services.'
State governments have been active as well, particularly with
respect to whether driver's licenses or in-state tuition should
182. David M. Cutler, Edward L. Glaeser & Jacob L. Vigdor, Is the Melting Pot Still
Hot? Explaining the Resurgence of Immigrant Segregation, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 478,
481 (2008).
183. See Lambert, supra note 3 (describing mass evictions in an area with suspected
illegal overcrowding).
184. See Fernanda Santos, Day Laborers' Lawsuit Casts Spotlight on a Nationwide
Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at 38 (discussing the effect of increased police
presence on immigrant day laborers congregating at unofficial hiring sites).
185. See, e.g., Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517-33 (M.D. Pa.
2007) (finding city ordinances aimed at immigrants to be preempted by federal law); see
also Ray Quintanilla, Towns' Melting Pots Boil Anxiety: Influx of Hispanic Immigrants
Causes Tension for Some, Cn. TRIB., May 29, 2007, at 1 (describing a proposed local
immigration regulation in Carpentersville "modeled after" Hazleton's); Editorial,
Immigration Battlefronts: Farmers Branch Should Sit out Appeals Process, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 2, 2007, at 20A (describing city ordinances which prevented illegal
immigrants from renting apartments).
406 [47:2
LOCAL FRAGMENTATION
require proof of legal residency.'86 Nor has the federal
government been entirely resistant to these developments, even
taking steps to incorporate local enforcement efforts into the
federal enforcement apparatus by recruiting the assistance of
local officials or formally training and deputizing them as federal
immigration enforcement agents.'
But, as the preceding sections have sought to demonstrate,
this is only a small part of a much bigger story. Indeed, even
more telling than the communities that have explicitly responded
in innovative ways to immigration inflows are those that have
not. The fact is that the subnational immigration responses that
have received the most attention are limited battles at the
margins-merely the most perceptible element of a structure of
existing spatial controls. Because of exclusionary zoning and
related regulatory mechanisms, most communities today are
already insulated from the most controversial of immigration
flows-namely, the poor immigrants who are most likely to be
regarded as a threat to upper- and middle-class norms and
pocketbooks-while those neighborhoods in which new arrivals
tend to congregate have long been open but isolated havens
produced in large part by the concerted exclusion of neighboring
locales. To the extent that local government law supplements the
spatial controls of our immigration regime through finer
calibrations on the ground, its effect is primarily in the stable
spatial organization reinforced by existing local government
structures that we often take for granted. It is no surprise then
that those communities that have responded in the most
sensational manner are those whose particular situations render
the traditional toolbox of spatial and community controls difficult
to implement."' Thus, the real story about the recent local
186. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a "Sanctuary"?, 61 SMU L. REv. 133, 151
(2008) (discussing policy concerns of state and local governments regarding
undocumented aliens).
187. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006) (authorizing the federal government to permit
designated officers in state and local law enforcement agencies to perform immigration
enforcement functions pursuant to a memorandum of understanding).
188. See, e.g., Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al (depicting struggling towns whose surplus
of abandoned residences and storefronts made traditional land use controls both
ineffective and unattractive); Laura Koss-Feder, A Slice of Prices, NEWSDAY, July 13,
2000, at C6 (describing suburban towns like Brookhaven, with more modest and
affordable homes relative to its Long Island neighbors, many of which are responsible for
the regional demand for immigrant labor); Devan Malore, Editorial, The Decline of Main
Street, ROANOKE TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at B11 (describing former industrial community
whose efforts to reverse its decline by encouraging the development of business and
industrial parks to lure companies from nearby cities also led to an influx of residents
from those cities seeking jobs and affordability).
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response to immigration is not the communities that have
adopted controversial immigration-related ordinances, but rather
the vast number of communities that, relying on existing
structural protections, do not have to.
III. THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF IMMIGRATION
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTROLS
To overcome the prevailing view of their dissimilarity, our
exploration of the intersection of immigration and local
government law thus far has focused on highlighting the
commonalities among spatial and community controls at the local
and national level. We have looked at similarities in their legal
reasoning and effect. We have also traced the shared history of
how doctrines specific to immigration and local government law
have arisen. The manner in which the local government
structure operates as a component of our immigration regime,
however, is as much a function of their differences as it is of their
likeness-differences that make them each uniquely useful in
certain contexts and for certain purposes. Emphasizing these
differences does not undermine the overarching claim that local
spatial and community controls should be considered a
component of our broader immigration regime. Rather, as I
demonstrate here, it offers further support by illustrating how we
rely on local controls to achieve results that cannot be realized
through traditional immigration regulations alone.
A. The False Choice Between National and Local Control
To be sure, this is not the way that the difference between
national and local control is usually understood. One reason for
this is the tendency among commentators and policymakers to
treat national and local controls affecting immigration as
essentially interchangeable. From this perspective, local
immigration-related controls are understood as either a partial
substitute for nonexistent or ineffective immigration policies at
the federal level,' or vanguard efforts aimed at eventual federal
adoption.' Another reason is the dominance of the preemption
issue. Indeed, considering that the issue of preemption lies at the
heart of the judicial origins of the federal immigration power, it
189. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 7, at 181 (advocating for local enforcement because
it aids federal enforcement).
190. See JEANNETTE MONEY, FENCES AND NEIGHBORS, at ix-x (1999) (explaining how




is not surprising that disputes about the breadth and limitations
of federal supremacy dominate the conversation with respect to
local immigration-related activities. As a result, instead of seeing
national and local controls as complementary parts, it begins
with the assumption that the relationship is one of competing
powers.
Taken together, these approaches recall Walzer's suggestion
that the development of an immigration policy can be understood
as a choice between national closure and neighborhood closure,
between a unified nation and a nation of petty states.'' But the
mechanics of this choice also oversimplify this relationship. We
have always relied on aspects of both to negotiate the competing
interests that we hold with regard to the practice of immigration
or the presence of immigrants. And the reason that both play an
important role, and often do so simultaneously, is that they are
each situated to address different aspects of immigration. As a
result, one can argue that the choice that Walzer presents and
many commentators seem to embrace is a false one. It is never as
simple as whether we want national control or local control, or
whether we would rather have open borders or open
neighborhoods. The choice lies in the multitude of configurations
that controls on the local and national can be deployed.
One way of understanding the false choice between national
and local controls is to focus on the ways in which local spatial
and community controls are employed not as substitutes for
federal immigration restrictions, but to effectuate a finer
calibration of its effects. This is especially true in circumstances
where outright national exclusion is not the most ideal outcome.
Consider, for example, the segregated Jewish neighborhood
in sixteenth-century Venice from which the term ghetto is
derived. The forced confinement of Jewish residents to one
district of the city is without doubt condemnable. At the same
time, the fact that Venice reversed long-standing admissions
policies to accept Jewish residents at all, especially when most of
Europe had up until that point excluded altogether or subjected
them to more extreme persecution is significant.'9 2 Indeed, the
Venetian relationship with its Jewish residents was marked by
an ambivalence that is common in immigration debates.
Although spatially and forcefully segregated from the rest of the
city, its residents were not excluded from playing a role in the
191. WALZER, supra note 38, at 36-39.
192. See BENJAMIN J. KAPLAN, DIVIDED BY FAITH 294, 299-300 (2007) ("From the
perspective .. . of the preceding period, [the ghettos] brought advantages and even
improvements in the conditions of Jewish life.").
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economy in which they lived and worked: they left the ghetto
each morning to transact business in Venice, returning to the
ghetto only in the evening, and were an essential part of the
Venetian economy.' From this perspective, the fact that Venice
allowed Jewish residents to enter and live in Venice during this
period, but excluded them both spatially and communally from
Venetian society, appears less the result of outright exclusionary
animus, but rather a crude negotiation of the city's simultaneous
economic dependence on, and cultural and religious rejection of,
these "foreigners."19 4 The creation of the ghetto (and additional
districts for other foreign nationals) was not a substitute for
Venice's lack of border controls. Rather, it was a complement to
Venice's desire to keep its borders relatively open.
In this respect, the historically common but now antiquated
practice of referring to immigrant communities as "immigrant
colonies" takes on a new significance.' As Professor Marcuse
forcefully argues in his typography of segregated spaces,
"colonies are linked to the colonizers, the masters have an
interest in, profit from, the work of the subject peoples."'96
Marcuse uses this description to explain how the severance of the
economic relationship between blacks and whites led to the
increasing isolation of black communities and the rise of what he
refers to as the "outcast" ghetto.' The colonizer-colonized
framework, however, also shines light on the relationship
between native and immigrant communities. Exclusionary
sentiments run high, but it is buttressed by the strong economic
reliance that our society has for the economic value, and
sometimes cultural amenities, that immigrants bring. It is also
for these reasons that only in the most extreme cases do racist or
nativist backlash lead to wholesale exclusion at the national
level.
193. RICHARD SENNETI, FLESH AND STONE 231-37 (1994); see also KAPLAN, supra
note 192, at 297-98 (describing the incomplete segregation of Jewish ghettos).
194. See KAPLAN, supra note 192, at 296, 318 ("[Tloleration [of Jewish residents]
was . . . a way to reconcile religious impulses with economic needs."). Jewish residents
were not the only group of "foreigners" who were segregated in the city. Foreign
quarters were established for a number of other groups, all of which were needed as
trading partners but rejected as fellow residents. See id. at 303-05 (explaining how
Muslims flocked to Venice for trade but, like the Jews, were segregated in separate
quarters).
195. See DAVID WARD, POVERTY, ETHNICITY, AND THE AMERICAN CITY, 1840-1925, at
95 (1989) (describing the early use of the term "colonies" to describe immigrant quarters
before moving to the term "ghetto").
196. Peter Marcuse, The Shifting Meaning of the Black Ghetto in the United States,
in OF STATES AND CITIES 109, 126 (Peter Marcuse & Ronald van Kempen eds., 2002).
197. See id. ("Those in today's black ghettos are not productive for their masters;
their masters get no benefit from their existence.").
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This offers one explanation for why New York City's effort to
zone out immigrant laborers working on Fifth Avenue at the turn
of the twentieth century was not intended as an effort to stop
immigration, and thus never translated into a broader campaign
for immigration restrictions. Indeed, notwithstanding the tension
between the Fifth Avenue store owners and the immigrant
garment workers they sought to exclude, they also shared a
unique relationship: the livelihood of the former depended on the
labor and goods supplied by the latter. Thus, unlike the broad
stroke of federal immigration reform, municipal zoning offered
Fifth Avenue storeowners a finer brush with which to balance
their need for immigrant labor and aversion to their presence.
And there are signs that a similar negotiation is at work today.
The controversy over immigrant residency in suburban enclaves
can be seen as an attempt to utilize local boundaries to navigate
their ambivalent relationship with immigrants as neighbors and
immigrants as workers due to the fact that "the new immigrants
challenge the suburban image while their labor helps to preserve
and enhance it."'99
Conversely, one can also see the interdependence of national
and local controls at play during times when national closure has
been invoked. Examples where state and local ordinances filled
the gap of national boundary or citizenship laws by accelerating
or multiplying the effects of national exclusion have been
extensively documented. Even more interesting, however, are
instances where local measures are used to fine-tune the broad
and sometimes indiscriminate effects that national exclusion
entails.
An early twentieth-century effort to preserve San Francisco's
Chinatown can be understood in this light. Whereas Chinatown
had long been viewed as a threatening space of vice, disease, and
cultural difference that resisted the great assimilating force of
mainstream American society, as the city of San Francisco
strived to position itself as a major metropolitan center,
Chinatown began to be viewed as an important cultural asset.
Thus, less than a generation after San Francisco sought to both
isolate and expel its Chinese residents, the city turned to similar
organizational techniques to reconstitute its fading Chinatown
precisely because it was becoming less "Chinese" and its
198. Indeed, the persistent need for immigrant labor may explain why most of the
earliest immigrant protections recognized by the Supreme Court concerned limits on
access to their labor. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1915) (striking down statute
that restricted employment of aliens).
199. ROSALYN BAXANDALL & ELIZABETH EWEN, PICTURE WINDOWS 240 (2000).
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residents more "assimilated."2 00 Local business leaders stepped in
to vigorously promote the use of Asian-inspired architectural
designs to demarcate Chinatown as an identifiable space, and
city leaders promoted fairs and festivals that showed off their
city's Chinese heritage.20 ' In addition, entrepreneurs of Chinese
descent were encouraged to participate in this preservation
effort, including dressing up in traditional Chinese garb during
city celebrations.20 Of course, this embrace of immigrant space
shares much with the exclusionary policies that took place
before: the efforts to maintain this space of ethnicity essentially
"amounted to an informal zoning policy that delineated separate
spaces within the city" though for the purposes of "offering
distinctive attractions to visitors."203 Yet rather than being a
reaction to Chinese immigration, it was a response to its
precipitous decline.
A third way of describing the false choice between national
and local is to recognize that national-level exclusion also
provides alternative means of tackling spatial and community
concerns that local controls are unsuited to address. For this, it is
worth considering the noted differences between the historic
hypersegregation of the black community and the less extreme
concentration that defined many immigrant enclaves. To be sure,
the extent to which immigrant groups in the past have been able
to align themselves with "whiteness,"20 4 or capture urban political
power and the employment that came with it,205 contributes to
the divergence between these two types of communities. An
alternative explanation, however, can be drawn from the fact
that mechanisms other than physical segregation and community
exclusion are sometimes available with respect to immigrants in
ways that were not applicable to others; namely, the possibility
that they can be compelled to leave the country entirely. From
this perspective, the segregation and concentration of
impoverished blacks actually shows the limits of the exclusionary
capabilities of local controls. In other words, the fact that
similarly marginalized immigrant groups avoided this fate was
200. Joseph A. Rodriguez, Planning and Urban Rivalry in the San Francisco Bay
Area in the 1930s, 20 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 66, 71 (2000).
201. See id. at 71-72, 74.
202. See id. at 72.
203. Id.
204. See ROEDIGER, supra note 21, at 8 (characterizing twentieth-century American
immigration as "assimilation to whiteness").
205. See WALDINGER, supra note 15, at 103-05, 209-11 (chronicling the English-




in some ways, ironically, due to the fact that the possibility of
cross-border flow provided a more permanent resolution. To be
sure, at times, the option to leave is invoked more or less
voluntarily by the immigrants themselves, such as the spike in
the return migration during economic downturns. In other
instances, however, national exit is brought about by more
coercive means. In both cases, it can be argued that
transnational mobility and immigration regulations allow for the
externalization of perceived "costs" in ways that local controls
can shift but not eliminate.20 6
A good example is the massive repatriation of Mexican
immigrants and their descendents from Los Angeles and Chicago
in the 1930s. Indeed, if the Great Depression set the cornerstone
for the creation of the contemporary black ghetto by excluding
them from white neighborhoods and job opportunities, it also led
to the wholesale dissolution of several Mexican and Mexican-
American barrios by casting many of their inhabitants out of the
country entirely.20' Blurring the distinction between the national
border and municipal boundaries, joint task forces involving local
and federal officials initiated massive raids of these
neighborhoods in theory to seize those eligible for deportation,
but in practice rounding up American citizens and legal residents
alike.208 After the federal raids, however, "cities and counties
across the country intensified and embarked upon [their own]
repatriation programs, conducted under the auspices of either
local welfare bureaus or private charitable agencies."209
Discrimination with respect to services and relief at the local and
national level were implemented to encourage those not netted to
repatriate "voluntarily." In addition to these sticks, carrots of
sorts were also provided: counties like Los Angeles operated a
series of repatriation trains to transport indigent Mexican
families as far as central Mexico.210 In the end, an estimated one
206. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS 55 (1955) (describing this
arrangement as a form of "internal colonialism" where the "colonial natives are kept with
us within distance when we want them-and then driven out of the community when no
longer needed").
207. See generally FRANCIscO E. BALDERRAMA & RAYMOND RODRIGUEZ, DECADE OF
BETRAYAL (1995) (chronicling the wave of deportation and repatriation efforts aimed at
Mexicans in America during the Great Depression); Kevin R. Johnson, The Forgotten
"Repatriation" of Persons of Mexican Ancestry and Lessons for the "War on Terror," 26
PACE L. REV. 1 (2005) (comparing the treatment of Mexicans during the Great Depression
to the treatment of Arabs and Muslims after the attacks of September 11).
208. See BALDERRAMA & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 207, at 55-60.
209. ABRAHAM HOFFMAN, UNWANTED MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 83 (2d prtg. 1976).
210. Id. at 86-87.
2010] 413
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW
million Mexican and Mexican-American residents were removed
nationwide, with Los Angeles alone repatriating as much as one-
third of its Mexican population, particularly those from
undesirable neighborhoods, in just six months.2 11
These examples serve to demonstrate the complex
relationship between spatial and community controls at the local
and national level. By understanding them in conjunction, we see
how these regulatory tools form, in a sense, our nation's true
immigration regime. It is precisely the differences of scale that
allow the two to pursue complementary goals from different
perspectives and often by employing contrasting policies.
B. The Case of Plyler v. Doe
Of all the contemporary immigration cases, Plyler v. Doe
remains one of the most controversial and widely discussed
decisions in the Supreme Court's doctrinal canon.212 Among its
supporters, it is widely "viewed as the ultimate aliens' rights
decision."21 3 Among its critics, Plyler represents judicial activism
and doctrinal confusion at its worst.214 Regardless of the various
views on Plyler, however, it is almost uniformly recognized as
"mark[ing] a fundamental break with classical immigration law's
concept of national community and of the scope of congressional
power to decide who is entitled to the benefits of membership."2 15
The facts of the case illustrate why questions of community
and membership are so central to this decision. One of the
earliest cases to deal with the issue of contemporary illegal
immigration, the Plyler Court was asked to decide whether the
Equal Protection Clause prevents the state of Texas from
denying illegal immigrants the right to obtain a free public
education in its local schools. 6 In rejecting the plaintiffs call for
strict scrutiny, the Court refused to recognize access to free
public education as a fundamental right and declined to accept
illegal status as a suspect classification.2 17 Nevertheless, in a
divided 5-4 decision, the Court still struck down this provision of
211. See id. at 126; GEORGE J. SANCHEZ, BECOMING MEXICAN AMERICAN 12 (1993).
212. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
213. Bosniak, supra note 111, at 1120.
214. See Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual
Agenda of Constitutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PrIT. L.
REv. 329, 337-41 (1983) (criticizing the Plyler Court for introducing a new and less
deferential standard of review).
215. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 54 (1984).
216. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 205.
217. Id. at 223.
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the Texas Educational Code as unconstitutional. 218 Noting the
relative innocence of the undocumented children involved in this
case who, unlike their parents, had no direct control over their
presence in this country, and the importance of education in
ensuring that no permanent under-caste develops in our
egalitarian constitutional order, the Court applied heightened
scrutiny and found the state's justifications for its prohibition
lacking.2 19
The Plyler decision is traditionally seen as an attempt to
negotiate the confusion that dominates the judicial and political
debates over the issue of illegal immigration. On the one hand, in
refusing to treat undocumented immigrants as a suspect class, it
reinforces the importance of legal statuses in a nation governed
by the rule of law. On the other hand, the Court was well aware
of the fact that undocumented immigrants are embedded in the
social and economic fabric of our society, and will likely remain a
part indefinitely. As a result, the Court's decision was both
pragmatic and idealistic-it employed traditional doctrinal
standards, but did so in a controversial manner to realize broader
constitutional norms: "The Equal Protection Clause was intended
to work nothing less than the abolition of all caste-based and
invidious class-based legislation. . . . The existence of. .. an
underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that
prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law."220
Thus, in rejecting the state's effort to preserve its "limited
resources for the education of its lawful residents,"22 ' Plyler
stands as an affirmation of the membership of illegal immigrants
in our overarching community and the responsibility that we all
have to ensure an educational opportunity for all our children.
But how extensive is this obligation? And, more importantly,
how extensive is the "we"? Standing alone, Plyler seems to signify
a high watermark for both immigrant protections and the anti-
caste principles of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet Plyler was
not the first time that the Court addressed a constitutional
challenge to provisions of the Texas Education Code. Eight years
earlier in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
the Court denied an equal protection challenge against the
state's education funding scheme, which contributed to
dramatically uneven funding outcomes for schools located in
218. Id. at 203, 208-09, 230.
219. Id. at 219-22, 230 (requiring a showing that denial of free public education to
undocumented children "further[ed] some substantial state interest").
220. Id. at 213, 219.
221. Id. at 227.
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different geographic districts.222 Nor was Plyler the last. Just one
year later, the Court in Martinez v. Bynum denied a challenge to
a provision of Texas's Education Code that denied free public
education to children whose parents did not have residency in the
local school district and whose presence in the district was for the
primary purpose of attending school. 223 Seen alongside Rodriguez
and Bynum, Plyler appears neither as promising as many of its
advocates celebrated, nor as costly as its critics contended.
Indeed, what these cases illustrate is that even while the Court
was willing to undermine the symbolic sanctity of the national
polity by extending its scope to include those who have been
purposefully excluded, it was only willing to do so after
preserving the divisions across local communities.
Consider first how the holding of Rodriguez complicates
both the promise and the principles of Plyler. In Rodriguez,
Mexican-American parents initiated a class action on behalf of
poor students residing in communities with low property tax
bases.24 The challenge asserted that the public school funding
structure set out by the Texas Education Code, which favors
communities with high property values, violated the Equal
Protection Clause by inequitably distributing educational
funding.25 It is worth noting that property taxes were not the
sole source of revenue for local school districts. Texas provided a
foundation grant based primarily on student enrollment to
every district for the purpose of ensuring that a minimum level
of education is provided across the state.226 As plaintiffs
demonstrated, however, because the rest of a school district's
education budget was culled from local property tax receipts,
the foundation budget did not prevent stark disparities from
arising. Comparing Edgewood Independent School District with
that of Alamo Heights, both of which were located in the San
Antonio Metropolitan Region, the Court noted that whereas the
former could only spend $356 per pupil with a local property tax
rate of $1.05 per $100, the latter was able to spend $594 per
pupil at a lower tax rate of $0.85 per $100.227 Moreover,
222. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
223. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 332-33 (1983).
224. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-5.
225. Id. at 15-16.
226. Id. at 24, 45.
227. Id. at 12-13. The per-pupil spending reflects the state's foundation grant, which
was $222 per pupil for both districts, as well as funding from federal sources. The rest
was made up of local tax allocations, of which Edgewood only contributed $26 per pupil
compared to Alamo Heights's $333. The Court noted preliminary figures reflecting a
recent foundation grant greatly increased state aid to Edgewood. But notably, this led
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although both districts were relatively the same geographic
size, Edgewood educated more than 22,000 students, of which
approximately 90% were of Mexican-American descent,
compared to the "predominantly 'Anglo' student population of
5,000 served by Alamo Heights.228 Nevertheless, the Court found
much of these statistical comparisons irrelevant. Rejecting
plaintiffs attempt to portray the case as one about
discrimination against the "poor" or an identifiable suspect
class, and holding that access to education is not a fundamental
right, the Court dismissed the equal protection challenge in a
divided 5-4 decision that found the state's funding scheme to be
rationally related to a compelling state interest.2 9
Like Plyler, Rodriguez has been the subject of extensive
commentary since it was decided, much of which has been critical
of the opinion's reasoning or result.23 What is of interest here,
however, is not the decision itself, but the degree to which it both
intersects with and tempers Plyler. If the holding of Plyler
secured the right of alien children to receive free public education
irrespective of their status, Rodriguez ensured that they have no
claim upon any community outside of the local political
jurisdiction in which they reside. Similarly, if an underlying
message of Plyler was that the importance of education to our
republic obligates us as a polity to collectively provide such a
service as a public good, even to those who do not have formal
membership in such a polity, Rodriguez affirms the practice of
Alamo Heights to receive an even higher foundation grant than Edgewood. Thus, the
disparities persisted. Id.
228. Id. at 11-13. It is interesting to note that the Rodriguez majority appears to
justify the disparities in part based on the fact that, although the districts are of the same
physical size, Edgewood has more than four times the number of students than Alamo
Heights. Id. at 13 n.33. As the Court explained, "If Alamo Heights had as many students
to educate as Edgewood does ... its per-pupil expenditures would ... have been
considerably lower." Id. As discussed in the previous Section, the fact that Alamo
Heights's student population (indeed, total population) is restricted in this manner is no
coincidence. Exclusionary zoning ensures larger property tracts, higher property values,
and lower numbers of students. More importantly, municipal boundaries and the
significant municipal residency ensure that such an arrangement creates fiscal
advantages.
229. Id. at 28-29, 37, 55.
230. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform,
24 CONN. L. REV. 773, 775 (1992) (claiming that the Court used local control "as a shield,
to ward off claims that the state has an obligation to revamp the existing school finance
system"); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218 (1978) (arguing that the Court's
analysis "support[s] the underenforcement of the equal protection clause by the federal
courts"); Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local
Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIs. L. REV. 83, 107-09
(criticizing the Rodriguez majority for framing the issue as one concerning local, rather
than state, autonomy).
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avoiding such obligations by defining oneself as being a part of a
separate community, albeit on the local level.
In other words, it is not just that Rodriguez recognized the
use of municipal and school district boundaries as tax havens,
where rich residents can provide their children with quality
education and low tax rates by ensuring that local revenues are
not redistributed to other children. It is also that to the extent
that in states like Texas where immigration is both a foundation
and a threat to the state's economic system, "other children" are
more often than not also associated with alienage and
immigration status. Thus, while race and ethnicity served as a
foundation for the plaintiffs equal protection claim in Rodriguez,
by the time the Court heard Plyler, it was clear that the issue of
immigration was inseparable from the local fragmentation at the
heart of the challenged disparities. Edgewood was not only
predominately Mexican-American, but it also served a larger
immigrant population than the predominately Anglo school
district of Alamo Heights."' The influx of immigrant children,
including those who are undocumented, had a disproportionate
effect on certain school districts over others.232 Similarly, because
of the spatial organization of communities in the state, Texas's
attempt to deprive state educational funding for undocumented
students had a much greater impact on schools that were already
disadvantaged under its funding scheme than those that had
been able to insulate their district, and thus their tax base, from
those unable to contribute their "fair share." Thus, the state was
able to defend the undocumented children prohibition as an effort
to support poor school districts in the lower court, prompting the
district judge to remark that "any spectator watching the state's
presentation of evidence might easily have mistaken it for a
retrial of the Rodriguez case, with the State of Texas acting as
amicus curiae for plaintiffs, emphasizing the plight of the
property-poor border school districts under the state's
educational financing scheme."2 3 3
What is interesting about Plyler and Rodriguez is that both
deferred to the traditional concept of local residency as a marker
231. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 11-13.
232. See Brief for School Districts: Harlingen Consolidated Independent School
District, Mission Independent School District, Brownsville Independent School District,
McAllen Independent School District, and San Benito Independent School District as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 1-3, Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (No. 80-
1538), 1981 WL 389992 (explaining that these schools will "bear a disproportionate part of
the financial costs that will result from a ruling of unconstitutionality" of the Texas
statute).
233. Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 589 (E.D. Tex. 1978).
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of membership and embraced the sanctity of local boundaries. In
Rodriguez, local control emerged as one of the compelling
rationales articulated for Texas's funding scheme." From the
Court's perspective, the challenge was asking the Court to
question the "State's judgment in conferring on political
subdivisions the power to tax local property to supply revenues
for local interests."' As Professor Barron explained, in the eyes
of the Court, the funding structure was an attempt by the state
to "facilitate, rather than to limit, local efforts to enhance the
educational interests of their residents because it authorized
local school districts to make additional financial contributions to
supplement the state's funds."236 The same can be said of Plyler.
At first blush, the orientation of the Plyler Court appears to be in
the opposite direction. It held unconstitutional a state
educational system that not only deprived local school districts
foundational grant money for undocumented children, but also
empowered localities to refuse to admit undocumented children
into their schools at their discretion. But like Rodriguez, the
Court invoked the tradition and sanctity of municipal residency
to strengthen its position. Thus, when the state argued that
Texas's prohibition against illegal immigrants can be read as a
test of local residence, which has traditionally been used as a
requirement for being granted access to schools in a particular
district, the Court rejected this argument by noting that it failed
to conform to "established standards by which the State
historically tests residence" in local communities.2 3 7 And in so
doing, the Plyler Court reified the importance of municipal
membership and local boundaries, which undermined the broad,
collective vision of community to which it is often attributed in
the immigration context.
Of course, Rodriguez is only one of Plyler's bookends. The
other, decided one Term after Plyler, was Martinez v. Bynum."'
In Bynum, Roberto Morales, a student born in McAllen, Texas, to
immigrant parents, sought admission to a local school
administered by the McAllen Independent School District. Unlike
other students living in McAllen, however, he resided there with
his sister, who assumed the role of custodian but "[was] not-and
d[id] not desire to become-his guardian," while his parents, who
234. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50.
235. Id. at 40.
236. David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local
Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 583-84 (1999).
237. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 n.22 (1982).
238. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321 (1983).
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were not American citizens, resided in Mexico.239 Claiming that
Morales was present in the school district "for the primary
purpose of attending the public free schools," the school district
sought to deny his enrollment on the ground that he was not a
local "resident" under section 21.031 of the Texas Education Code
and thus not entitled to attend its school.240 In response, a suit
was filed alleging that the provision was unconstitutional.2 4 1
Finding the challenged provisions to be a bona fide residency
requirement-indeed, one more generous than traditional
residency requirements-the Court held that prohibiting Morales
from attending school in McAllen, or any other district in the
state, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.242
At one level, Bynum echoes Rodriguez in affirming the
degree to which local communities are not only allowed, but
expected to prefer its residents over the claims of outsiders. As
the Bynum Court held, a "bona fide residence requirement,
appropriately defined and uniformly applied, furthers the
substantial state interest in assuring that services provided by
residents are enjoyed only by residents."243 In the Court's view,
to ignore or reject this interest not only impinges on state and
local autonomy, but "there can be little doubt that the proper
planning and operation of the schools would suffer
significantly."24 At another level, however, the Court's ruling on
local residency in Bynum is directly tied to issues at the heart of
Plyler. Because of Morales's unique situation, the Court's
decision was not simply about the integrity of the boundaries
around the McAllen school district, or even that of the state of
Texas. At issue was also the effect that this local residency
requirement has on transnational migration and the rights and
privileges of national citizenship.2 45 Indeed, the challenged
provision in Bynum was a part of the same immigration-
stemming efforts at issue in Plyler. As the district court found,
"[a]t least one of the legislative purposes behind Section
21.031(d) was to inhibit the migration of persons residing in
239. Id. at 322-23.
240. Id. at 323.
241. Id. at 324.
242. Id. at 332-33.
243. Id. at 328.
244. Id. at 329.
245. Id. But see id. at 333 (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that because the case
was presented as a facial challenge, the constitutionality of the statute as applied to
"Roberto Morales, a United States citizen whose parents are nonresident aliens," was not
implicated and suggesting that a "different set of considerations would be implicated" if
that situation were before the Court).
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Mexico to attend schools in the United States, and the
Supreme Court specifically quoted the district court's finding
that the adverse impacts of invalidating Section 21.031(d) would
not only be "overcrowded classrooms and related facilities," but
also because it would require the "expansion of bilingual
,,241programs.
Read alongside Plyler, the result in Bynum appears
surprising. Under Plyler, an undocumented child with no legal
right to reside in the country and subject to removal cannot be
denied free access to a public school in the jurisdiction where he
and his parents reside. Under Bynum, however, an American
citizen child can be foreclosed from attending any public school in
the United States because his parents are unable to secure
residency in a local community. Indeed, the import of Bynum can
be seen as going even further than just the deprivation of
educational opportunities; because of the vital role that education
plays in American society and the almost universal adoption of
similar residency requirements in localities across the nation,
this deprivation could be seen as constituting a de facto exclusion
of an American citizen from residing in the United States
altogether.
But if we begin, as we did here, with Rodriguez, the result of
Bynum is not so much an affront to the commitments of Plyler or
the guarantees of citizenship, but rather an important
clarification of their limits.248 And once again, those limits involve
the interplay of immigration with the institution of local
citizenship and the meaning of local boundaries. Thus, despite
the Plyler Court's attempt to distinguish the rights of the child
from the conduct and status of his parent,24 9 Bynum affirms that
in the local context, the ability of one's parent to acquire
residence in a given neighborhood not only affects the type of
education that one will receive, but also whether one is able to be
educated in the United States at all.250 The Court specifically
246. Arredondo v. Brockette, 482 F. Supp. 212, 216 (S.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 648 F.2d
425 (5th Cir. 1981), affd sub nom. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321; see also Jackson v. Waco Indep.
Sch. Dist., 629 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. App.-Waco 1982, no writ) (explaining that Section
21.031(d) "was enacted in response to litigation regarding the rights of alien children to
attend Texas schools" (emphasis added)).
247. Bynum, 461 U.S. at 329 n.9.
248. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227 n.22 (acknowledging that state school
districts are "as free to apply to undocumented children established criteria for
determining residence as they are to apply those criteria to any other child who seeks
admission").
249. See id. at 220 (stating that the children "can affect neither their parents'
conduct nor their own status").
250. See Bynum, 461 U.S. at 332; see also id. at 336 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
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rejected Texas's argument in Plyler that it can deny free public
education to undocumented students in order to save limited
state resources for "its" residents.2"' At the same time, the ability
of localities to favor residents over outsiders was embraced as
one of the primary reasons why the McAllen school district's
denial of admission was permissible.
In short, Plyler alone tells only one part of the overall story.
It reveals only a small slice of how local government laws were
structured to target immigrants and regulate immigration, and it
provides only a small window of the overall immigration regime
at work. When Plyler is seen alongside Rodriguez and Bynum,
however, the reach and consequence of the Court's decision is put
into proper context. The important point is that, in the end, all
three cases were essentially about the same thing: controlling
cross-border and cross-community flows. To be sure, some of the
efforts were directed at the national border while others were
directed at local boundaries, and consequently the Court
employed different adjudicatory tools in their analysis.
Nevertheless, seen in the context presented above, it is not
entirely clear that one is as conceptually or legally different from
the others as is commonly assumed.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LOCAL FRAGMENTATION
AS IMMIGRATION REGULATION
Our immigration regime involves not only the ways in which
our nation maintains its physical or political boundaries, but also
the ways in which we enable and maintain the fragmentation of
our local communities. This was the finding of Part II, which
demonstrated the doctrinal and historic relationship between
federal immigration laws and the legal organization of local
communities. The reason for this organization, I have suggested
in Part III, is that it allows for finer negotiations of the disparate
interests underlying immigration and a more targeted calibration
of its diverse effects. But like all structures, there are
implications for relying on local fragmentation in this manner.
Returning to the claim that initiated our inquiry-the
essential connectedness of local and national forms of spatial and
community controls-the next two sections will look at the
(citing an example where a child who had attended McAllen schools was denied admission to
the school after her parents divorced and moved away, and she now lived with her brother).
251. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 227.
252. See Bynum, 461 U.S. at 328-29 ("A bona fide residence requirement .. . furthers
the substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its residents are
enjoyed only by residents.").
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futility of the national-local divide and the consequences of
relying on fragmentation, respectively. This Part is, then, at its
most basic level, an account of how seeing local fragmentation as
a part of our immigration regime provides additional contexts to
certain aspects of immigration law. But beyond this, it also
suggests that the doctrinal and historic reorientation asserted
thus far raises even broader questions with respect to our
understanding of the role of immigration regulations and
potential implications for immigration policies going forward.
A. The Futility of the National-Local Divide
The foregoing analysis of Plyler illustrates what is omitted
when our view of immigration is drawn too narrowly, when local
contexts such as those described by Rodriguez and Bynum are
deemed irrelevant to our nation's complex and often multi-tiered
negotiation of immigration. But even if courts and commentators
directly confronted this connection, would it help produce a more
coherent formulation of the national-local divide than we have
now? Considering the role of this divide at the center of the
plenary formulation of the immigration power, it is not
surprising that this question continues to garner such
widespread attention. And for those on the front lines of the local
turn in our nation's immigration response, the stakes are often
more than academic. The lesson of seeing local fragmentation as
part of our immigration regime, however, may actually be the
futility of searching for this divide. At the very least it is because
the tools that we have for drawing the necessary lines simply fail
to address many local aspects of the immigration regime
described here. But it is also because the endeavor misconstrues
the role of immigration regulations in a more fundamental way.
The fact is that how immigration is experienced and
understood by most Americans does not fit easily into the mold of
immigration regulations cast by established laws and deep-
seated doctrine. The intimate, local context where the effect of
immigration is the most immediate and transparent (the
inscrutable signs on Main Street, the new sports leagues in the
neighborhood park, the unfamiliar languages heard in familiar
congregations) not only informs, but profoundly shapes how the
issue and regulation of immigration is perceived. As a result, the
regional and neighborhood struggles that shape our lived
environment-the informal turf wars, the contentious zoning
hearings, the endless search for the right neighborhood and good
schools-cannot help but be seen by most as intertwined with the
national conversation over immigration quotas and border
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enforcement. I do not mean to deny the added importance that
immigration poses for how we define our nation as a whole. But if
the nation is, as Benedict Anderson so famously described, an
"imagined community," then it is not surprising that it is the
local context that so often serves as the reference point from
which our individual version of this collective narrative is
formed.253 From this perspective, local players and backdrops like
those involved in recent immigration controversies like
"Operation Firestorm," or more famously in Hazleton, are not a
new setting for today's border wars, as some have suggested.25 4
Rather, they are in some sense, the only scale on which border
wars can truly take place.
Recognizing this duality complicates how the national-local
divide factors into policy disputes over immigration policy going
forward. Thus, irrespective of what position we assume as
participants in the immigration debates, difficult questions still
remain with respect to the role that local boundary and
membership rules should or should not play. As a conceptual
matter, emphasizing the interactions and relationships between
mechanisms of control and across different institutional scales
casts doubt on treating local disputes as mirror images of
national battles. This is especially true when we are faced with
the possibility that our current system of immigration admission
may not be as welcoming as it is today if the means of local
differentiation examined earlier did not exist, or conversely, that
it may be more welcoming if additional measures of local
protectionism were available.
On a more immediate level, reorienting the national-local
divide in this manner confronts us with the extent to which we
are willing to accept the local consequences of what may be
required to achieve our national immigration goals. Indeed, for
those of us who champion the anti-caste goals of Plyler on
principle, support may not be as easily offered if the caste-like
privileges guaranteed by Rodriguez and Bynum-privileges we
often work hard to make sure that our children enjoy-are also
on the line.255 Though I pose this issue rhetorically, about-faces
253. To be sure, local communities are often no less an imagined community than
nation-states. See Frug, supra note 64, at 262-63 (quoting BENEDICT ANDERSON,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 15 (1983)).
254. See FARMINGVILLE (Camino Bluff Productions 2004) (promoting documentary
movie about the hamlet in Brookhaven where Operation Firestorm took place with the
tagline, "Welcome to the suburbs, home of the new border wars").
255. Cf San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49 (1973) ("The
history of education since the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between
two forces: the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all
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when policy questions are presented in this manner are not
unheard of. Take, for example, early supporters of a Colorado
ballot measure to ban bilingual education in public schools.
Although supporters of the proposal were initially critical of
bilingual education for giving special treatment to immigrants
and discouraging their assimiliation, they later balked en masse
when a controversial ad campaign suggested that the abolition of
bilingual education would mean the integration of "those" kids
into the classrooms of their children.256
Despite best efforts, the traditional tools with which the
national-local relationship is adjudicated largely fail to capture
this reality. As a result, the current emphasis on how the
doctrine of preemption or the principle of federalism should be
applied to local involvement in immigration may not be as
central as normally believed.257 At the most basic level, it is
because these legal frames of adjudication are simply
inapplicable to many aspects of the immigration regime
described here-aspects that are a part of how we respond to and
negotiate the impact of immigration as a nation, but lie squarely
at the foundation of our system of localism. Preemption offers the
promise of clear, bright lines deduced through a delineated
process, and it offers an easy route to tackle many of the
seemingly novel local responses that have arisen. As it is
currently implemented, however, boundary and membership
controls like zoning and residency requirements simply fall
outside of preemption's limited scope. Substantive balancing of
federalism principles, as many now advocate, provides a robust
and flexible counterpart to categorical preemption. But in
addition to being itself a contested and evolving framework,258 in
emphasizing distinct spheres of autonomy, it is less likely to
acknowledge and more likely to ignore or deny the essential
connection between national and local posited here.
At a deeper level, however, the problem with preemption and
federalism lies in the fact that they ascribe to assumptions that
children, and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its
own children." (quoting James Coleman, Foreword to GEORGE DRAYTON STRAYER &
ROBERT MURRAY HAIG, THE FINANCING OF EDUCATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, at vii,
vii (1923))).
256. Recent Legislation, Colorado Voters Reject an English Immersion Ballot
Initiative, 116 HARv. L. REV. 2709, 2712-13 (2003).
257. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (noting the erosion of federal
plenary power over immigration regulations and the rise of more localized controls).
258. See, e.g., ROBERT W. HOFFERT, A POLITICS OF TENSIONS xi (1992) (noting that
the meaning of federalism is endlessly contested); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE 161-77 (2007) (discussing
the evolution of federalism in the United States).
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are fundamentally at odds with how immigration flows and their
diverse impacts are negotiated. Preemption and federalism apply
at recognized points of conflict and often in such a manner that
admits of only one "winner." In doing so, it often runs the risk of
oversimplifying the relationship of centralization and
decentralization as concepts locked in a zero-sum game in which
one gains only at the expense of the other. Nevertheless, the
story of the co-development of comprehensive schemes of spatial
and communal organization at the national and local level belies
this simplicity. The mutual interdependence at the heart of this
story suggests a cooperative structure of federalism and localism
that is not easily captured by how federalism is usually invoked
in court.25 But more importantly, the concurrent rise of what has
now become the doctrinal foundations of immigration and local
government law suggests a mutually constitutive view of
centralization and decentralization in which, rather than being
competing forces, the expansion of one may actually depend on
the expansion of the other. Arguing along these lines, Richard
Ford describes how, in addition to the conventional story that
centralization requires the imposition of uniformity and
suppressing of local differences, there is also the opposite:
"typology, sorting, differentiation to an ever more 'precise' and
infinitesimal degree," from which "localism in all its particularity
and difference" can be seen as "the child, rather than the enemy,
of the modern state."260 Taking stock of the local influence on the
formal centralization of immigration authority, or federal efforts
to promote local fragmentation at a time when the nation was
wrestling with the diverse impacts of foreign immigration and
other migratory flows, the development of our nation's
immigration regime seems to be one part of this overarching
story.
I do not mean to underestimate the difficulties that this
reorientation poses to immigration activists. Considering the
complexities that it introduces, I am not surprised that many
refer to the multiple institutional scales on which the battle over
our immigration regime is being waged as either signs of a
broken system in need of comprehensive reform, or as examples
259. See, e.g., MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 80 (Daniel J. Elazar ed.,
Transaction Books 1984) (1966) (explaining that a "mixture of federal, state, and local
regulation covers an area of regulation or activity"); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a
Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665-66
(2001) (arguing that a "'dual federalism' characterizes many of the Supreme Court's
recent statements on the constitutional law of federalism" but that "[iun reality, however,
Congress continues to enact 'cooperative federalism' regulatory programs").
260. Ford, supra note 134, at 911.
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of the needless and irrational disputes that local involvement
provokes.26 1 Nor do I overlook the simplicity promised by the
traditional federal-oriented model. Maintaining an exclusive
sphere of federal control makes reform efforts much easier to
achieve; rather than fighting battles in all fifty states, or the
thousands of counties, cities, and towns, centralization offers a
single concentrated target upon which pressure can be exerted,
and a designated forum where policy disputes can be reconciled.
There is also reason to believe that an exclusive national policy
vindicates norms of uniformity while ensuring, as much as
possible, a well-informed and well-reasoned debate insulated
from parochial bias or local incompetence.26 2
The problem is that I am not so sure that the kind of
centralization typically envisioned in the immigration discourse is
accurate or even desirable. From the vestiges of colonial
settlement laws to the imposition of Chinese exclusion, we saw a
regulatory system that began with the premise that national and
local concerns were inextricably intertwined. And as national
quota legislation divided the world in ways not unlike what zoning
and local government fragmentation sought to achieve in
America's new settlements and emerging metropolitan regions, we
saw how local and national mechanisms of control were connected
in an effort to define nested boundaries and negotiate layers of
belonging. Considering the historical account set forth here, the
multi-tiered approach may in fact be the centralized scheme that
we, as a nation, have long settled on. At the very least, I believe
that continued adherence to federal exclusivity simply ignores the
regime that we currently have, or belies the fact that most people
do not see it as a conflict to maintain different views on how we
should respond to immigration as a nation versus how we should
respond as a community or as individuals.
Moreover, considering how the impact of immigration is felt
on the ground, the limitations of federal mechanisms of control,
and the vast diversity of competing views, it is arguable that we
261. See, e.g., Editorial, The Border Deal, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 3,
2006, at 8A ("The trouble is that neither local nor state leaders can resolve the problem of
illegal immigration. It's a job for Congress, one that North Carolinians should be
impatient to see national leaders tackle."); Stella M. Hopkins, N.C., S.C. Targeting Illegal
Workers, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, May 13, 2006, at 1A ("But states can't solve a national
problem piecemeal. Immigration is a federal issue, and Congress needs to act, in part to
provide illegal immigrants already here with a path to citizenship." (quoting Michele
Waslin, director of immigration policy research for the National Council of La Raza)).
262. See, e.g., Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 552-58
(2001) (offering policy-based reasons why "the federal immigration power should not be
capable of devolution by statute").
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settled upon this national-local structure for good reason.
Indeed, the varied and sometimes inconsistent positions taken at
the national and local level may be what have lent such relative
stability to how our country has negotiated what is often
understood to be an intractable and destabilizing issue. In this
respect, the mantra that comprehensive federal reform is the
silver bullet for all immigration ills may be illusory, especially as
no consensus exists over what form such reform should take and
for what reason. Maintaining a strict national-local divide will
not necessarily eliminate national-local conflicts, or reduce the
instances of questionable enforcement strategies, as has been the
case with recent federal raids and other such practices that have
drawn ire and condemnation from the communities in which they
have taken place. 26 3  Nor would renewed emphasis on
centralization mean that sub-federal governments will somehow
be spared from having to wrestle with the impact of immigration
or, more importantly, the impact of federal action with respect to
immigration. Congress has shown itself willing, in the name of
exercising its power over immigration flows, to impose drastic
and substantial social and financial costs on state and local
governments, as it did with the dramatic curtailment of federal
means-tested benefits for legal immigrants in 1996.264 But given
that the deplorable actions of some communities are usually
celebrated as grassroots mobilization by others, are we willing to
give up on the alternative routes to reform that local involvement
assures as a consolation to national dismissal or federal paralysis?
So why do we insist on reinserting a rigid separation of
national and local in our conversations about immigration if it
does not comport with how most people understand the issue and
cannot be adequately addressed by existing legal doctrines? We
do so, I believe, because it is easy. It is easy because it drastically
simplifies policy debates when immigration is invoked. It is also
263. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, Officials Protest Antigang Raids Focused on
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at B3 (describing a raid that officials claimed was
designed to arrest suspected gang members, but which others argued was simply a raid
on illegal immigrants); Jennifer Medina, Arrests of 31 in U.S. Sweep Bring Fear in New
Haven, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at B1 (describing an illegal immigrant raid that
occurred in New Haven and the inhabitants' resulting fear).
264. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §§ 400-451, 110 Stat. 2105, 2260-76 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); IMMIGRANTS, WELFARE REFORM, AND THE POVERTY OF
POLICY 6 (Philip Kretsedemas & Ana Aparicio eds., 2004); ANGELO N. ANCHETA, RACE,
RIGHTS, AND THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 38-39 (1998); see also Peter Skerry,
Many Borders to Cross: Is Immigration the Exclusive Responsibility of the Federal
Government?, PUBLIUS, Summer 1995, at 71, 78 (describing the impact of federal




easy because in a contentious debate like immigration
characterized as having strange bedfellows, consensus can
usually be built around scapegoating the local-to dismiss local
responses by referring to stereotypes about local officials (e.g.,
corrupt, incompetent, unprofessional) or particular local
communities (e.g., coastal big city, southern small town,
exclusive white suburb). The national-local divide then is both a
cause and symptom of the extreme and polarizing posture that
has gripped the immigration debates.
Reorienting the national-local relationship gives proper
recognition to the fact that immigration is not itself exceptional
as a practice or a field of legal regulation. In addition, it explains
the enduring significance of neighborhoods and communities
even, or especially, as issues are increasingly described in
national or global terms. I do not mean to suggest that the
approaches described here answer more questions than they
raise. But in doing so within the local context, it carries the
potential of offering grounded and manageable means of
engagement, and the possibility of finding alliances and
commonalities not present before.
B. Assessing Fragmentation
By positing local fragmentation as a component of our
immigration regime, we have come to a more expansive vision of
how different tiers of regulatory controls interact in the context
of immigration. But this fragmentation describes a particular
form of spatial, communal, and institutional organization. Thus,
at this point, a normative question still remains: What are we to
make of this specific arrangement?2 65 When law is invoked to
regulate spatial geography or manage communal and
institutional membership at the local level, the impact on our
immigration regime is not always incidental or indirect.
Oftentimes, it goes directly to not only the balance of our system
of immigration regulations or how immigration policy is made,
but also how the issue of immigration is understood. And in this
respect, the contexts in which the desirability of local
265. With the questions posed in this manner, the response that I offer below echoes
earlier arguments that I have made suggesting local government reform as a solution to
certain immigration dilemmas. See Su, supra note 9, at 1681-83. But whereas my
previous analysis was limited to the phenomenon of local immigration regulations, which
I presented as a product of localism rather than a consequence of immigration policy, I
approach this question here from the alternative framework developed in this Article, in
which localism is understood as a part of our country's immigration regime and thus a
critical factor in that regime's development.
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fragmentation is at issue are many and unavoidable: when
zoning boards decide where to site affordable housing or whether
to permit them at all, when localities set housing standards
governing the relation and number of people who can occupy a
given residence, when states decide who may attend what schools
and how those schools are funded, when government authorities
determine where roads and public transportation routes should
go and who should be served,2 66 and when families take into
consideration the resulting organization to determine where to
buy their house and what neighborhood to call home.
Throughout this Article, effort has been made to challenge
preconceptions about this fragmentation by incorporating the
broader debate over immigration. Thus, in the face of legitimate
concerns about its exclusionary or balkanizing effects, I have at
times suggested that as a critical part of how we have historically
balanced the competing interests of immigration, local
differentiation may be what has made our immigration regime,
and the broader structure of inclusion that it makes possible,
both palpable and workable here in the United States. In some
ways, this trade-off raises concerns about exploitation, especially
the way it has enabled us to import labor without necessarily
importing neighbors. But as our discussion about immigrant
enclaves has shown, the mediating effects of fragmentation
arguably offer benefits to both immigrants and natives alike. In
short, in setting forth the view of local fragmentation as a critical
component of our immigration regime, I have tried to present a
nuanced and balanced view of the role of the particular type of
fragmentation that has been employed.
There are, however, consequences to using fragmentation in
this manner, and we would do well to recognize some of these in
considering the role of fragmentation in immigration policies
going forward. Indeed, for all that it pays off by enabling short-
term compromises, it also extracts in long-term costs. We
certainly cannot ignore, for example, the problems current local
inequities of resources and opportunity will bring about down the
road. The dangers of what many now refer to as segmented
assimilation have long troubled social scientists,2 67 just as many
266. See Cutler, Glaeser & Vigdor, supra note 182, at 489-91, 494 (attributing
contemporary immigrant-native segregation in part to disparities in the availability of
public transportation).
267. See, e.g., HALL, supra note 44, at 428-36 (describing concerns of early twentieth-
century sociologists with concentrated poverty and the creation of the "marginal man");
Alejandro Portes & Min Zhou, The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its
Variants, ANNAIS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SCl., Nov. 1993, at 74, 82 (1993) (discussing the
disparities in potential success immigrants face due to the problem of segmented assimilation).
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of America's longstanding domestic dilemmas can be attributed
to the multiplier effect of concentrated poverty and racial
segregation.' In this respect, those in the immigration discourse
should take heed of the volume of literature on the consequences
of fragmentation on immigrants, their family, and our
communities. It is also worth noting, however, how the availability
and use of local fragmentation shapes, in a more direct though
sometimes unconventional manner, the context in which
immigration controversies arise, how we set about to resolve it,
and the very nature of how the issue of immigration is understood.
First, it is important to recognize that opposition to
immigration is often as much a distributional issue as it is one of
prejudice or cultural anxiety. What I mean is that alongside the
native-immigrant conflict, or even the national-local divide,
there is also an interlocal dimension centered on how the relative
benefits and burdens of immigration are allocated among
communities, many of which view each other as both neighbors
and competitors. It is no wonder then that tensions most often
arise in inner-city neighborhoods or poor rural towns, many of
which feel that they have the most to lose and the least options to
accommodate or withstand change relative to what they perceive
to be their peers. Indeed, even when opposition coalesces in more
affluent suburban communities, it often arises from feelings that
their community is being asked to absorb the impact of
immigration to a degree that is disproportionate from what is
being asked of even more exclusive neighbors in the region. Some
of the most forceful arguments against immigration have been in
the name of protecting what many perceive to be the most
vulnerable communities.269 Yet this inequitable distribution of
benefits and burdens is not only the very basis upon which our
immigration regime may have been set up, it is also a direct
consequence of how local fragmentation has been orchestrated
through the use of legal and social mechanisms of control. In this
respect, to the extent that fragmentation stifles opposition to
immigration in certain respects, it is also responsible for
exacerbating interlocal tensions that in turn produces other
grounds for opposition that are directly tied to the differentiation
that fragmentation employs.
268. See generally MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 13, at 148-49, 179-80 (linking
socioeconomic disadvantages to segregation); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED (1987) (discussing the relationship between segregation and poverty).
269. See Gerald D. Jaynes, The Effects of Immigration on the Economic Position of
Young Black Males, in AGAINST THE WALL 87, 88 (Elijah Anderson ed., 2008) (stating that




Second, local fragmentation has implications for how we
assess the promise of assimilation. At the most basic level, it is
because the exclusion and insularity that fragmentation breeds
stifles the interpersonal interactions and institutional exposure
that is often associated with the assimilation process. But it is
also because local fragmentation itself sets up an internal tension
in the very idea of assimilation itself that is hard to unravel.
Assimilation, however defined, requires a model-a particular
target toward which assimilation is directed. The fact that this
model is malleable and varies over time has led many to see
assimilation as a historical process involving not only changes
among immigrant groups, but also concurrent shifts in how the
dominant "culture" is defined.27 0 But the "target" of assimilation
also varies across space; certain communities as opposed to
others are often considered to be more exemplary, more
mainstream, more "American." And that privilege is maintained
not only by the characteristics of that community itself or of
those who reside there, but also how that community holds itself
in opposition to neighboring localities or even alternatives that
have yet to be realized.2 ' Thus, if fragmentation stifles
assimilation by drawing dividing lines, those lines also define the
parameters of what we consider to be successful assimilation-
parameters in which the end-goal of assimilation in the spatial
context may necessarily be that which is defined by exclusion and
thus cannot legitimately be reached. This is not to say that
immigrants do not assimilate, or that the American mainstream
has not been subject to revisions. But it does illustrate one
reason why, even if assimilation appears to be fluid and
inevitable from a historical perspective, the process always
appears to be on the brink of collapse at any given time. Whereas
space is effaced through the luxury of hindsight, its destabilizing
role is brought into stark focus when we assess the state of the
process looking forward.
Third, the effect of local fragmentation on local
decisionmaking has direct consequences for how national
decisions over immigration are reached. Of the many
controversial arguments that Peter Brimelow makes in Alien
Nation, his now famous exhortation of American immigration
policy, the one he emphasizes the most is his claim that our
270. See ALBA & NEE, supra note 20, at 282 ("Assimilation has reshaped the
American mainstream in the past, and it will do so again, culturally, institutionally, and
demographically.").
271. See Schragger, supra note 12, at 459 ("The definitional work of 'community' is
accomplished interstitially-at the borders between places.").
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current system is undemocratic.27 2 On this general point, I agree.
Where we diverge is that while Brimelow takes it as a given from
simplistic polling data that the vast majority of Americans
simply wants less immigration, I believe the actual sentiment on
the ground is a lot more diverse and fractured. The
"undemocratic" nature of fragmentation then is that although it
allows for a certain degree of negotiating these competing
interests, as an institutional structure it is ill-suited to foster the
type of broad-ranging discourse that immigration, in all its
layered complexity, requires. It is not that participatory
democracy is not viable or useful in small-scale settings of
fractured communities. Rather, it is that the manner in which we
have structured the relationship between these communities,
especially the emphasis placed on boundaries and membership,
fosters a defensive posture centered on avoidance and
nonconfrontation rather than genuine engagement, however
cautious or reluctant that may be.273 Stated in the language of
Albert Hirschman's seminal study of organizations, the type of
fragmentation that now typifies American society is structured
around "exit" rather than "voice."274 And as a pivotal basis of our
nation's overall response to immigration, it is not surprising that
the effect of this manner of organizing our lived environment is
also reflected in how we define the imaginary community of the
nation-state through our immigration policies.
In short, just as ignoring or denying the relevance of the
local leads to an incomplete picture of our immigration regime,
broadly denouncing or wholly accepting the role of fragmentation
is also too cursory an approach. How it influences immigration is
multifaceted and complex, and thus the manner in which we
address fragmentation as an immigration issue should be equally
aware and refined. Fragmentation of some sort may prove too
valuable or useful an organizing tool to jettison wholesale. But
we need not accept the particular form of fragmentation that has
arisen either. Just as it is the case with our formal admission
criteria and removal standards, any approach to our
fragmentation policy will ultimately lie in the details: how we
address the exclusionary consequences of fragmentation while
272. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION, at xvi (1995).
273. E.g., PERIN, supra note 10, at 106 ("I speculate that suburbanites resort to spite
fences because, unlike city dwellers, they are accustomed to using walls but not rules.");
see also ABRAMS, supra note 206, at 281-83 (arguing that a homogenous pattern of
housing development promotes group conflict and breeds anxiety and frustration).
274. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 106 (1970) ("The United




enabling communities of distinction and self-determination;"'
how we balance desires for efficiency and proficiency with a
genuine commitment to participatory democracy; and how we
ensure a measure of distributive justice while giving effect to
individual choice. The fact that a great deal of possibilities lies in
how we define the significance of space and membership, and the
institutional consequences of dividing lines, provides much room
for innovative proposals. From a solely local outlook, reforms
ranging from regional councils and interlocal proportional voting
aimed at transforming individual perception and affiliation on
the one hand,276 to large-scale county consolidation and
neighborhood-level decentralization targeting distributional
inequalities and institutional responsiveness on the other, have
been proposed.277 If, as suggested here, neither the role of the
local nor, more particularly, the purpose of fragmentation lends
itself to easy characterization, then we would do well to
incorporate similar efforts in the broader discourse on the slow
and continuous process of immigration reform as well.
V. CONCLUSION
A little more than a year after "Operation Firestorm" forced
dozens of immigrant residents out of the Town of Brookhaven,
other residents in the "hamlet" of Farmingville, located in and
formally a part of Brookhaven, are seeking an exit of sorts as
well. A certain segment of the community is taking the well-worn
steps toward secession and independence: "Farmingville, or at
least the more affluent half of it, where few if any of the new
immigrants live, would have itself be known instead as the
village of Oak Hills."'
So it would appear that when attempts to differentiate
people and space prove less than adequate, efforts to define
communities and partition institutions are still available.
Traditional immigration analysis has thus far struggled with
how to reconcile these spatial and community controls with the
275. See WILLIAM T. BOGART, DON'T CALL IT SPRAWL 187 (2006) ("Valuing diversity
requires respecting differences, including the choice to live separately.").
276. See Frug, supra note 64, at 294-99, 328-34 (discussing possible reforms such as
regional legislatures or proportional voting).
277. See, e.g., MILTON KOTLER, NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT 104-05 (1969)
(explaining that cities are writing new charters to gain more power and arguing that
communities must convene local assemblies in neighborhoods to deliberate and debate
community issues); DAVID RusK, INSIDE GAME OuTsIDE GAME 4-11 (1999) (suggesting
ways that "highly fragmented regions" can "act as one").
278. Paul Vitello, Rift over Illegal Immigration on L.I. Leads to Talk of Secession,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at B1.
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national components of our immigration regime; if not too
unrelated, they are perceived as too local. What our inquiry has
revealed, however, is that rather than strangers, adversaries, or
awkward companions, local government law and the
fragmentation that it has produced may be a critical and
arguably necessary component of our nation's immigration
regime.
Realizing this means that local fragmentation cannot be
easily condemned, nor can the local role in immigration be
outright dismissed. It does not mean, however, that we must
accept the delicate yet deliberate balance that has been struck
between spatial and community controls on the national and
local level. Their interdependence suggests that we understand
the broad and sometimes hidden effects that reform at any given
point can have on the regime as a whole. Yet the national-local
reorientation described here also reveals the myriad options and
possibilities that are available. Bringing this structure to light is
thus an important step in realizing how competing interests over
immigration can be reconciled and negotiated going forward.
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